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ESSAY
SUBDELEGATING POWERS
Jennifer Nou*
The traditional portrait of the administrative state often features the
politically-appointed agency head at its center: the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, or the Secretary of the
Department of Labor. This picture of bureaucratic power, however, is
incomplete. For much of that power is, in fact, subdelegated within the
agency. The implication is that decision rights are often exercised not by
statutory delegates, but rather by lower-level officials and tenure-protected
career staff. The purpose of this work is to bring these background
actors—like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Director of
Enforcement—squarely to the foreground.
In doing so, this Essay develops a positive theory for how and why
agency heads subdelegate their power and analyzes the resulting
normative implications. The analysis draws on a rich social science
literature to argue that delegations within agencies are best understood
as credible commitment devices through which agency heads motivate
better-informed but potentially biased subordinates. This decision to
commit, however, is itself subject to the internal transaction costs of
reviewing subordinate recommendations. These dynamics, in turn,
suggest a role for courts to maximize high-quality information within
agencies by taking credibility into account in their appointments and
removal jurisprudence; deferring to subdelegations promulgated through
transparent, deliberative procedures; and providing clearer ex ante
guidance as to when internal subdelegations will be judicially enforced.
At the same time, political actors (not courts) should police the countervailing concern that subdelegation can also be used as a tool of partisan entrenchment.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 474
I. SUBDELEGATION’S TRADE-OFFS........................................................... 483
*. Neubauer Family Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Many
thanks to Ryan Bubb, Tony Casey, John Ferejohn, Daryl Levinson, Gillian Metzger, Anne
Joseph O’Connell, John Patty, Eric Posner, and Kathryn Watts for helpful comments and
conversations. Thanks also to participants in Fordham Law School’s faculty workshop,
Michigan State University’s Roundtable on New Administrative Law Scholarship, N.Y.U.’s
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, and Ohio State University Moritz College of Law’s
faculty workshop. Alan Hassler, Kirby Smith, and Rebecca Smith provided excellent
research assistance.

473

474

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:473

A. Advisors Versus Authorities ........................................................ 484
B. Information Production and Transmission ............................... 490
II. CREDIBILITY AS A CONTINUUM ............................................................ 496
A. Institutionalizing Commitment.................................................. 497
B. Enhancing Commitment ............................................................ 500
C. Applications................................................................................. 507
III. IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................... 511
A. Courts .......................................................................................... 511
B. Political Actors............................................................................. 523
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 525
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law’s central anxiety is the exercise of delegated
power. This angst, more often than not, is directed at delegations from
Congress to an administrative agency—spawning countless legal conundrums: which institutions should have interpretive primacy,1 whether the
statutory delegate’s identity matters,2 and whether the nondelegation
doctrine should be revived.3 These normative debates, in turn, also have
positive counterparts. Decades of interdisciplinary scholarship ask why
and under what conditions legislatures delegate in the ﬁrst place. Prominent theories, for example, posit that Congress delegates to agencies to

1. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1983) (“Deference, to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of what
might have been the judicial view res nova—in short, administrative displacement of
judicial judgment.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 925 (2003) (“Should courts decide legal questions on their own, or
should they give some weight to the views of the relevant agency?”).
2. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2326–
31 (2001) (arguing for an interpretive principle “that when Congress delegates to an
executive official, it in some necessary and obvious sense also delegates to the President”);
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 263, 267 (2006) (arguing “as a matter of statutory construction the President has
directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under the statute or to bind the
discretion of lower level officials—only when the statute expressly grants power to the
President in name”).
3. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 839–44 (1997) (considering
and rejecting the revival of a “strong or even a weak” nondelegation doctrine); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1721, 1722–23 (2002) (arguing “there just is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has
there ever been”).
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exploit their superior expertise,4 reduce policymaking transaction costs,5
or otherwise shift political blame.6
From these perspectives, politically-appointed agency heads—say,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)—are the main arbiters
of delegated authority. In reality, however, much of that power is subdelegated within the agency.7 Agency heads, that is, take authority granted
from Congress or the President and further redelegate it to their
subordinates. As a result, tenure-protected career staff and lower-level
political officials often make decisions initially granted to their superiors.8
In this manner, characters less familiar to the administrative law literature now come to the foreground: the EPA’s Chief Financial Officer,9 for
instance, or HHS’s Director of the Office for Civil Rights.10
Delegation in some form, of course, is a necessity in large organizations like bureaucracies. Agency heads have limited time. They have
ﬁnite resources. They must thus rely on their staff for discrete tasks.
These assignments, however, are usually accompanied by structures and
processes to coordinate institutional decisionmaking.11 In other words,
even if staff members or other subordinates make initial recommenda4. See, e.g., Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (1991)
(explaining legislative organization as a means through which legislators gain information
and formulate policy amidst uncertainty); Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial
Models of Delegation, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293, 294 (2004) (noting one rationale for
delegating is to gain superior expertise); J. Bendor, A. Glazer & T. Hammond, Theories of
Delegation, 4 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 235, 264 (2001) [hereinafter Bendor et al., Theories of
Delegation] (observing “it is often rational for an uninformed principal to delegate
authority to an informed agent; it is rather obvious that tapping the agent’s greater
expertise can provide gains”).
5. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 7 (1999) (arguing that
legislative decisions to delegate to the executive reﬂect a tradeoff between the “internal
policy production costs of the committee system” and the “external costs of delegation”).
6. See Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 44–
47 (2d ed. 1989) (“The bureaucracy serves as a convenient lightning rod for public
frustration and a convenient whipping boy for congressmen. But so long as the bureaucracy
accommodates congressmen, the latter will oblige with . . . grants of authority.”).
7. See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
9. See Memorandum from Gina McCarthy, Adm’r of EPA, on request to Revise
Delegation 1-16 Relating the Charge of Biennial User Fees to Maryann Froehlich, Acting
Chief Fin. Officer, EPA (Dec. 2, 2013) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
10. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights; Statement of Delegation of Authority, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,381 (Dec. 28, 2000).
11. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Institutional Administrative Decisions, 48 Colum. L.
Rev. 173, 173 (1948) (“An institutional decision of an administrative agency is a decision
made by an organization and not by an individual or solely by agency heads.”); Jennifer
Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 429–30 (2015) (arguing that
agency heads “choose intra-agency coordination mechanisms to facilitate the production
of information” to enable decisionmaking).
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tions, their decisions usually undergo intra-agency review before becoming the “agency’s” decision. As a result, agency heads often remain the
ﬁnal decisionmaker. By contrast, when the EPA Administrator formally
subdelegates her authority, she allocates the decision right to someone
else within the agency. Such decision rights are usually accompanied by
signature authority—literally, the authority to affix one’s signature and
sign off on an agency action without higher-level oversight.12
The resulting stakes can be high. Consider a particularly dramatic
controversy over population measures in the 2000 U.S. Census. The 1990
census had relied primarily on mail-in forms and thereby “missed record
numbers of people that had been traditionally hard to count, mainly
members of ethnic and racial minorities.”13 In response, President Bill
Clinton’s Secretary of Commerce proposed using statistical sampling to
adjust the 2000 census count.14 However, House Republicans sued to
block the use of this method, which was expected to beneﬁt Democrats
in the congressional-reapportionment process.15 The Supreme Court sided
with the House Republicans, holding that the Census Act prohibited the
practice.16 Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration maintained that population counts derived from sampling could still be used for redistricting
and determining the allocation of federal funds.17
On June 20, 2000, the Secretary of Commerce proposed a rule
subdelegating the authority to the presidentially-appointed and Senateconﬁrmed Director of the Census Bureau to decide whether to use
statistical sampling.18 The Director’s authority would be “final.”19 Otherwise,
12. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 201, 238 (“Authorship is a familiar concept in agency practice; indeed, agencies
today are admirably (if surprisingly) punctilious about this feature of their interpretive
rulings and other actions.”).
13. Steven A. Holmes, In a First, 2000 Census Is to Use Sampling, N.Y. Times (Feb. 29,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/29/us/in-a-first-2000-census-is-to-use-sampling.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
14. Id.
15. Barbara Vobejda, Republicans Sue to Prevent Sampling, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 1998),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/aug98/census022198.htm [http://
perma.cc/9PLM-JRJ8].
16. Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999)
(“[T]he Census Act prohibits the proposed uses of statistical sampling in calculating the
population for purposes of apportionment.”).
17. See Juliet Eilperin & Barbara Vobejda, Census Battle Decelerates in Congress,
Wash. Post (Apr. 15, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/april99/
house15.htm [http://perma.cc/DA6P-ZX6L].
18. Report of Tabulations of Population to States and Localities Pursuant to 13
U.S.C. 141(c) and Availability of Other Population Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,370 (June
20, 2000) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 101); see also 13 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1) (2012) (“The Bureau
shall be headed by a Director of the Census, appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, without regard to political affiliation.”).
19. Report of Tabulations of Population to States and Localities Pursuant to 13
U.S.C. 141(c) and Availability of Other Population Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 38,370.
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“[r]eview of the Director’s decision by the Secretary of Commerce would
at a minimum create the appearance that considerations other than
those relating to statistical science were being taken into account.”20
Representative Dan Miller, the Republican Chairman of the Subcommittee
on the Census, questioned the validity of the proposed rule in a series of
letters to various members of the Department of Commerce and the
Census Bureau, arguing that “there is a serious difference between
delegating . . . to a subordinate, and divesting oneself of final review and
reversal power”—the latter being impermissible under the Census Act.21
Agency subdelegation of this nature is a more pervasive phenomenon than commonly recognized, sometimes even by agency heads
themselves. As one former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
member marveled, “[f]rom time to time, you might read in a newspaper
about a ‘Commission action,’ and you will have no idea what it is
about.”22 Often it will turn out, however, that “the staff ha[s] taken
action pursuant to the more than 376 separate rules where the Commission previously granted delegated authority to the SEC staff.”23 These
SEC subdelegations range in recipient and scope. For example, the
Commission’s internal Director of the Division of Trading and Markets is
authorized to act on thousands of rule ﬁlings from self-regulatory organizations, including various exchanges and clearing agencies.24 The SEC
has also subdelegated authority to the Director of the Division of Trading
and Markets to grant exemptions from important Exchange Act Rules,25
as well as from rules regarding short sales.26 The Director of the Division
of Corporation Finance is authorized to grant or deny issuer waivers.27
The Commission has further delegated authority to the Chief Accountant
to temporarily suspend rules issued by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board.28
And the SEC is hardly alone. At one point in time, the EPA recorded
over 500 subdelegations by its own count, roughly half within its

20. Id.
21. Letter from Dan Miller, Chairman, House Subcomm. on the Census, et al., to
John H. Thompson, Assoc. Dir. for Decennial Census, Bureau of the Census (Aug. 4, 2000),
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/feas17.pdf [http://perma.cc/6KPR-B22K].
22. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner Aguilar’s (Hopefully) Helpful Tips for New SEC
Commissioners, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/
statement/helpful-tips-for-new-sec-commissioners.html [http://perma.cc/5KPS-TTGJ].
23. Id.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(12) (2016). The following examples in notes 22–28 are all
pointed out by former SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar. Aguilar, supra note 22.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3(a)(7)(ii).
26. Id. § 200.30-3(a)(15).
27. Id. § 200.30-1(a)(10).
28. Id. § 200.30-11(b)(5).
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headquarters and the rest distributed among its regional offices.29 The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) devotes signiﬁcant parts of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to hundreds of delegated authorities.30 Other agencies like the Consumer Product Safety Commission
similarly delegate authority but memorialize it only in internal agency
documents.31 Subdelegations are also the subject of recent high-proﬁle
litigation. Faced with quorum-killing vacancies, the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) delegated some responsibilities to its Executive
Director.32 In the ensuing litigation, the Tenth Circuit upheld the actions.33
Subdelegations are likely to become even more common should legislative gridlock result in further vacancies.34
In the real world, subdelegation matters. Yet little is known about
this important bureaucratic practice: Under what circumstances do
agency heads delegate to their subordinates and why? Which powers are
subdelegated, and to whom? What explains variations in these dynamics,
if any, across different agencies? At ﬁrst glance, one might think the
positive story just mirrors that of delegation one level up. Perhaps bureaucrats delegate for the same reasons that legislators do. There are good
reasons to think, however, that this instinct is misplaced given their
diverging goals, cultures, and norms.35 Thus, while social scientists and
29. See U.S. EPA, EPA-202-F-94-002, Delegations of Authority—What Managers Need
to Know 1 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, Delegations of Authority].
30. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.201-0.392 (2015).
31. See 16 C.F.R. § 1000.11 (2016) (“Delegations are documented in the
Commission’s Directives System.”).
32. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1190–92 (10th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015). These tasks included the duty to maintain
a federal voter registration form, which the Executive Director recently refused to modify
to include state-speciﬁc proof-of-citizenship requirements. See U.S. Election Assistance
Comm’n, The Roles and Responsibilities of the Commissioners and Executive Director of
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/workflow_staging/
Page/348.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DUG-MQ4N] (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
33. Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1199.
34. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking,
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1828–30 (2015) (discussing the various effects of legislative gridlock); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays
in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 966–68 (2009) [hereinafter
O’Connell, Vacant Offices] (outlining a timeline of delays in nominations and conﬁrmations between 1987 and 2005).
35. First, administrative agencies operate according to disparate norms and with a
culture distinct from that of Congress. See generally James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What
Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, at xvii (1989) (exploring why “government
agencies—bureaucracies—behave as they do”). While agencies are grounded in hierarchy
and professionalism, Congress features more horizontal politicking. Id. Agency heads also
live in distinct political ecosystems. Agencies are monitored by the President, congressional committees, and interest groups possessing different means of control, while
legislators are subject to the vagaries of the ballot box. See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic
of Congressional Action 5 (1990).
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legal scholars have long focused on delegation to agencies, the focus here
is on delegation within agencies.
Subdelegation, in turn, complicates many longstanding debates in
administrative law. Perhaps most obviously, it adds another dimension to
separation-of-powers disputes, which emphasize the ways in which the
legislature and executive battle to impose their respective preferences.36
The fact that presidential appointees can subdelegate their authority to
sympathetic subordinates is a less-recognized means of partisan entrenchment. Relatedly, defenders of the “unitary executive” have celebrated the
myriad ways in which Presidents have centralized and consolidated
control over the bureaucracy, especially through their appointments.37
Subdelegations to career civil servants, however, weaken this mechanism
of executive power. When administrations turn over, subdelegations
remain in place until and unless they are repealed.38
Administrative law scholarship has also increasingly turned from the
external separation of powers (between the President, Congress, and
courts) to the internal separation of powers—that is, the counterbalances
offered by various agency actors.39 This literature often presents career
The respective goals of agency heads and legislators also often differ. While agency
heads are tempted by the revolving door, re-election is one of the primary goals of
legislators. See id. (arguing that reelection is the “dominant goal” of Congress members);
Paul J. Quirk, Industry Inﬂuence in Federal Regulatory Agencies 143–45 (1981). Finally,
an important insight of the theory of the ﬁrm is that transaction costs within institutions
(like agencies) differ from those between institutions (like Congress and agencies). As a
result, one would expect transaction-cost-reducing measures like delegation to differ in
the two contexts.
36. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 5, at 7–10 (advancing a “transaction cost
politics” approach to understanding when and why Congress cedes power to the executive
branch); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2312, 2341–42 (2006) (“We should expect Congress to be considerably less
willing to delegate policymaking discretion to the executive branch when the policy
preferences of the two branches diverge.”).
37. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive:
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush 10--13 (2008) (describing various “[d]isputes
over presidential power to control executive branch subordinates”); David J. Barron, From
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1096 (2008) (evaluating the trend of Presidents using appointments to control agencies).
38. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 610–16 (2003) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Agency Burrowing].
39. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314 (2006) (discussing intra-executive
checks and balances in foreign policymaking); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 425
(2009) (noting the importance of considering both “internal constraints” and the “crucial
relationship between internal and external checks on the Executive Branch”); Jon D.
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (2015)
[hereinafter Michaels, Enduring, Evolving] (exploring “a secondary, subconstitutional
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staff as nonpartisan keepers of professional norms.40 Considering such
staff members as recipients of delegated authority with their own preferences and biases, however, calls into question the extent to which they
facilitate, rather than buffer, ﬁghts between their political principals. In
this view, civil servants can amplify, as opposed to mitigate, potential
abuses of power.41 Finally, legal scholars have also disputed the extent to
which the administrative state is “ossiﬁed”—that is, rendered impervious
to change by increasing legal requirements.42 Subdelegations to experienced subordinates, however, can expedite agency action through the
internal reallocation of resources.43
To help shed light on these practices, this Essay advances a positive
theory for how and why agency heads subdelegate their power and analyzes the resulting normative implications.44 It is based on a close study of
separation of powers that triangulates administrative power among politically appointed
agency leaders, an independent civil service, and a vibrant civil society”); Jon D. Michaels,
Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227, 235 (2016) (discussing the relationship
between administrative separation of powers and external constitutional actors).
40. See, e.g., Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 39, at 534 (describing career
staff as “subconstitutional, rivalrous counterweights” that “constrain the political leadership
atop administrative agencies”).
41. See infra notes 282–285 and accompanying text.
42. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossiﬁcation Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1414, 1439 (2012) (“The ossification literature predicts . . . that the accretion
of the various procedural constraints imposed by the courts, the White House, and
Congress on bureaucratic autonomy has severely impacted the ability of federal agencies
to fulﬁll their § 553 notice and comment rule-writing obligations.”); see also Stephen M.
Johnson, Ossiﬁcation’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001–
2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767, 782 (2008); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying”
the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal RuleMaking “Ossiﬁed”?, 20 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 261, 267–68 (2006).
The fear of ossiﬁcation alone has motivated many to propose reforms like more
negotiated rulemaking, reduced judicial review, or the repeal of regulatory analysis
requirements that could expedite the rulemaking process. See Thomas O. McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 130–
31 (1991); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative
Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance
in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 8–12 (1997).
43. See, e.g., Delegation of Authority to Director of Division of Enforcement, 74 Fed.
Reg. 40,068, 40,068 (Aug. 11, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (“This action is intended
to expedite the investigative process by removing the need for enforcement staff to seek
Commission approval prior to performing routine functions.”).
44. A preliminary objection to the pursuit of a positive theory of the bureaucracy is
that agencies are too heterogeneous for study as a category. But theories of the ﬁrm
similarly abstract away from even greater institutional diversity, nevertheless producing
useful insights. Many legislative theories reduce legislative forms to their essentials in
order to allow for comparative analysis. See Amie Kreppel, Typologies and Classiﬁcations,
in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies 82 (Shane Martin et al. eds., 2014).
Similarly, agencies have recognizable unifying characteristics: They are all policymaking
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existing and historical subdelegations within a wide range of administrative agencies; in this sense, it is a work of qualitative, grounded
theory-building.45 The burden is to develop a compelling, parsimonious,
and falsiﬁable explanation for a signiﬁcant amount of the observed
variation in subdelegation practices.46 Drawing on a rich social science
literature, this Essay argues that delegations within agencies are best
understood as credible commitment devices through which commissioners motivate better-informed but potentially biased subordinates.
The central positive claim is that variations in subdelegation practices reflect differences in agency heads’ willingness to delegate credibly.47
More speciﬁcally, the theory predicts that an agency head will commit
more credibly to a subdelegation in order to induce more information
production, but only within a bounded range of expected preference
divergence and internal transaction costs. As the potential bias of the
delegate increases, the agency head is more likely to opt for veto
authority. Conversely, as preferences align, the agency head is more
willing to subdelegate credibly since she can obtain additional information
without the same risk of bias. At the same time, the transaction costs of
reviewing and reversing a subordinate’s recommendation also matter.
When the transaction costs of internal review increase, the agency head is
more likely to delegate credibly since doing so eliminates those transaction costs.
Previous legal scholarship on agency subdelegation, by contrast, has
largely focused on matters of statutory interpretation: whether Congress
explicitly permitted the delegation and, if not, how to understand legisinstitutions with delegated authority exercised by political appointees and career staff,
subject to budget constraints. That said, future work will likely reﬂect further upon the
extent to which agency heterogeneity affects both empirical and theoretical attempts to
understand the federal bureaucracy.
45. See Jerry W. Willis, Foundations of Qualitative Research 306–09 (2007) (deﬁning
“grounded theory” as a qualitative approach in which researchers examine “successive
waves of data” to build a theory that seeks to be parsimonious, internally consistent, and of
appropriate scope, explanatory power, and generalizability). See generally Juliet Corbin &
Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing
Grounded Theory (2008) (outlining a framework for qualitative-research analysis).
46. In an ideal world, this project would have also incorporated mixed methods,
including a large-N quantitative analysis of internal delegations across various agencies.
Examining such data over a number of years could help yield more systematic insights on
variations over time and under different political constellations. Compiling such a dataset
in this context, however, is not feasible: The Code of Federal Regulations is not available
in machine-readable XML format, nor do agencies always publish their subdelegations in
the CFR, as this paper will discuss. See infra section II.B.3 (discussing agency transparency
and the publication of subdelegations).
47. See, e.g., Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, Contracting with Imperfect Commitment
and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case, 69 Econometrica 1077, 1077–79
(2001); Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, Contracting for Information Under Imperfect
Commitment, 39 RAND J. Econ. 905, 905–07(2008).
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lative silence or ambiguity.48 A related issue is the extent to which the
President has an inherent constitutional authority to subdelegate or
whether the nondelegation doctrine demands congressional authorization.49 Still other scholars have proposed that judicial deference to
agency interpretations should extend only to those signed off on by
agency heads, rather than their subordinates.50 And perhaps most
relevantly here, Professor Elizabeth Magill has examined how agencies
“self-regulate” in order to maintain control over subdelegations.51 While
a broader literature considers how agencies delegate to external actors
like other agencies52 or private parties,53 the main focus here is on
internal delegations.
More speciﬁcally, Part I frames the problem in terms of the agency
head’s choice to delegate ﬁnal authority to a subordinate or to retain a
veto after reviewing the subordinate’s recommendation. The decision
involves trade-offs between the relative potential for superior information, bias, and internal review costs. Part II considers the ways in which
agency heads can make their delegations more credible in order to
motivate information production. These design choices include greater
reputational backing, transparency, longevity, dissolution, and, ﬁnally,
entrenchment. As such, one of this Essay’s main contributions is to examine how credibility is institutionalized within administrative agencies.

48. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries,
105 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 50), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2841253
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (examining statutory issues of subdelegation in the
context of adversarial agencies); Nathan D. Grundstein, Subdelegation of Administrative
Authority, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144, 144–45 (1945) (describing the question “to be
probed” as the extent to which the power to subdelegate authority may be implied when
Congress does not make an explicit provision authorizing it); Jason Marisam, The
Interagency Marketplace, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 886, 892 (2012) (noting “[t]he question of
whether Congress has authorized subdelegation is a matter of statutory interpretation”);
Note, Subdelegation by Federal Administrative Agencies, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 808, 808–09
(1960) (“[T]he problem of permissible subdelegation is primarily one of statutory
interpretation.”).
49. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2175 (2004).
50. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 12, at 201–05.
51. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 898
(2009) (“An agency may self-regulate in order to control internal delegations so that those
within the agency do not have opportunities for arbitrary or corrupt exercises of state
power.”).
52. See, e.g., Bijal Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 Yale J.
on Reg. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(examining “coordinated interagency adjudication in which agencies transfer wholesale
their jurisdiction to adjudicate administrative decisions to other agencies”).
53. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 718–
19 (2010) (arguing governmental organizations use “workarounds” to delegate authority
to private parties that can inﬂuence administrative outcomes).
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Part III’s normative prescriptions, in turn, follow from the previous
positive premises: Generally stated, courts should maximize the use of
high-quality information in the administrative state by encouraging credible delegation. Doing so will increase the likelihood that expertise within
agencies is used efficiently. Speciﬁcally, subdelegation raises constitutional concerns given that tenure-protected employees could exercise
signiﬁcant delegated authority. In this context, courts should apply a
more functional understanding of political control attuned to the credibility and nature of the subdelegation. Moreover, judges should only
extend Chevron deference to a subdelegation when the agency head has
delegated authority in a way that is transparent and otherwise evinces a
commitment to elicit expertise.
Furthermore, courts should also help to encourage credibility when
enforcing internal delegations under the Accardi doctrine—the basic
principle that an agency must abide by its own rules.54 Because the
doctrine still creates uncertainties for subordinates deciding whether to
invest resources, judges should set clearer bright-line rules to facilitate
information-forcing grants of authority. Finally, this Part also grapples
with the potential for agency subdelegation to be used as a tool of
partisan entrenchment—a means for agency heads to project their
preferences beyond their tenures. As such, it argues that political actors,
rather than courts, are best situated to prevent the entrenchment of
delegations that can undermine democratic accountability.
I. SUBDELEGATION’S TRADE-OFFS
This Part develops a positive theory for when and why agency heads
internally delegate power to their subordinates.55 In doing so, it builds on
the work of scholars like Sean Gailmard, John Patty, and Matthew
Stephenson to highlight the various trade-offs that administrators face in
the decision: between more information and bias, and between internal
transaction costs and a loss of control. The ﬁrst section frames the
delegation problem as a choice between ﬁnal and reviewable subdelegations—in essence, the choice between treating staff as authorities or
advisors. The second section then ampliﬁes these dynamics and the
organizational costs of advice giving within the bureaucracy. In doing so,
it explores the relationship between information production and ﬂow
54. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954)
(holding the agency failed to follow its own regulations by allowing the Attorney General
to “dictat[e] the Board [of Immigration Appeal]’s decision”). See generally Thomas W.
Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 569, 569 (2006) [hereinafter Merrill,
The Accardi Principle] (“Agencies must comply with their own regulations. This is
sometimes called ‘the Accardi principle’ . . . .”). For recent cases citing Accardi, see, e.g.,
Burdue v. FAA, 774 F.3d 1076, 1082 (6th Cir. 2014); Brown v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1141, 1148
(9th Cir. 2014).
55. See sources cited supra note 45.
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within agencies and, more speciﬁcally, how the transaction costs of conveying information can inﬂuence the agency head’s initial decision to
subdelegate.
A.

Advisors Versus Authorities

Managing a bureaucracy, like managing a business, requires entrusting tasks to others. Agency heads have ﬁnite resources and skills. They
cannot personally approve—let alone research, analyze, and evaluate—
the myriad decisions required to be made on a daily basis. Agency heads
must thus rely on their subordinates to perform many functions.56 These
subordinates include an ever-“thickening” array of political appointees57
as well as thousands of civil servants.58 Political appointees are generally
selected by the President or an agency head.59 Their tenures are not
56. See Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 122–23 (1947)
(noting that the administrator “could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of the
task, to exercise his personal discretion” on every matter over which Congress granted him
authority); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 491 F.2d 1141, 1146
(2nd Cir. 1974) (upholding a new commissioner’s ability to “confer[] with his staff” regarding
rulemaking proceedings that preceded his tenure rather than personally reviewing all of
the materials).
57. See Paul C. Light, Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion
of Accountability 8 (1995).
58. This characterization is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. More accurately, federal
government personnel consist of three categories: the merit-based competitive service, the
Senior Executive Service (SES), and those who are “excepted” from merit-based restrictions.
See O’Connell, Vacant Offices, supra note 34, at 925–26. Of these categories, the ﬁrst two
consist almost entirely of career employees who are hired through statutory examination,
selection, and placement rules. 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (2012). The SES “contains career
employees as well as political officials, but political appointees can make up no more than
10 percent of the whole SES (or one-quarter of the SES slots in any one agency).”
O’Connell, Vacant Offices, supra note 34, at 925–26. These employees are, in turn, only
removable “for cause,” speciﬁcally upon a showing of “insubordination.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303,
7513(a), 7521(a)–(b); see also Jason Marisam, The President’s Agency Selection Powers,
65 Admin. L. Rev. 821, 863 (2013).
The excepted service, in turn, is composed of those employees exempt from the
competitive service by statute, executive action, or the Office of Personnel Management.
See Mike Litak, U.S. and Them: Citizenship Issues in Department of Defense Civilian
Employment Overseas, Army Law., June 2005, at 1, 3. The excepted service itself contains
three subcategories: Schedules A, B, and C. Schedule A includes jobs for which it would be
“impractical” to use standard qualiﬁcation requirements, such as specialized professions
like law, medicine, and chaplaincy. Schedule B also refers to jobs for which exams would
be inappropriate but for which applicants nevertheless must meet certain qualiﬁcation
standards; it “is typically used for new agencies” as well as student internships. And, ﬁnally,
Schedule C includes lower-level political appointees that “keep a conﬁdential or policydetermining relationship to their supervisor and agency head,” such as special assistants.
Excepted Service Appointing Authorities, U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., http://archive.opm.gov/
Strategic_Management_of_Human_Capital/fhfrc/FLX05020.asp [http://perma.cc/K4U336X7] (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
59. Political Appointees, U.S. Office of Gov’t Ethics (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.oge.gov/
Web/oge.nsf/Resources/Political+Appointees [http://perma.cc/6UGY-K9LR].
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protected, lasting an average of two years.60 They possess a dizzying array
of titles such as deputy secretary, deputy undersecretary, principal deputy
administrator, or assistant deputy administrator, among others.61 Civil
servants, by contrast, possess tenure and salary protections.62 By law, they
are hired on the basis of merit, not political ties.63 As a result, they often
enter government with professional norms informed by technical or legal
training.64
Agency heads thus face a choice in how to manage interactions with
their subordinates: They can either assign a decision to them while
retaining veto authority or else delegate the decision entirely.65 Put
differently, agency heads can review their underlings’ recommendations
or else let them make the ﬁnal choices. Call the former reviewable
subdelegations and the latter ﬁnal subdelegations.66 To illustrate this (for
now) simpliﬁed distinction, take the grant of authority at issue in a
recent constitutional challenge to how administrative law judges (ALJs)
are appointed within the SEC.67 The SEC is authorized by Congress to
enforce securities laws either by ﬁling civil suit in federal district court or
else through administrative adjudication.68 The Commission granted its
ALJs the authority to conduct administrative hearings.69

60. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Spring 1998, at 81, 83, 93.
61. Light, supra note 57, at 12 tbl.1-3.
62. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111; see also
Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem
of Bureaucracy 7 (2007) (observing that civil servants have “strict tenure guarantees, have
no expressed ties to the administration or to Congress, and by law are to be politically
neutral”).
63. Johnson & Libecap, supra note 62, at 7.
64. Id.
65. See Wouter Dessein, Authority and Communication in Organizations, 69 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 811, 812 (2002) (“[T]he principal optimally delegates control as long as the
divergence in preferences is not too large relative to the principal’s uncertainty about the
environment.”); Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Giving Advice vs. Making Decisions:
Transparency, Information, and Delegation 2–3 (Oct. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Gailmard &
Patty, Giving Advice] (unpublished manuscript), http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/
u/4231163/GailmardPatty-TransparencyInformationDelegation-October2014.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BJ6F-RVG9] (explaining how principals can delegate authority either completely or partially).
66. This distinction between reviewable and final subdelegation is artificially simplified
for now to gain some initial analytical traction. In reality, as will be discussed below, there
is a range of institutional design questions between these two choices, including whether
to make such subdelegations temporary or indeﬁnite, transparent or nontransparent, and
so on. See infra Part II.
67. See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding
the constitutionality of SEC ALJs as consistent with the Appointments Clause).
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-9 (2016)).
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The relevant statute, however, allowed the Commission a choice in
how to treat the ALJ’s initial adjudicatory decision.70 On the one hand,
the SEC could “adopt regulations whereby an ALJ’s initial decision would
be deemed a ﬁnal decision of the Commission.”71 This delegation would
be a ﬁnal subdelegation: The ALJ’s decision would be the agency’s decision. On the other hand, the SEC could instead choose to extend a
reviewable subdelegation—the path it eventually took.72 More specifically,
the SEC established an internal review process in which it gave itself time
to review the initial order; should the Commission decline such review, it
would then issue an order to that effect.73 Because the subdelegation was
nonﬁnal in this respect, a panel of the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the ALJ’s appointment scheme, though the ruling will now be
considered en banc.74
At ﬁrst glance, one might wonder why agency heads would ever
choose a ﬁnal over a reviewable subdelegation—why treat subordinates as
authorities rather than mere advisors? Why not instead, as with the SEC’s
ALJs, keep the option to reject a decision even while rubberstamping it?
After all, delegating is dangerous: There is a persistent risk that the
delegate will be deﬁant or otherwise make a bad decision.75 To minimize
that risk, one might think it always better to retain the ability to restrain
wayward subordinates. Final subdelegations, by contrast, entail a pledge
not to reverse the subordinate’s decision.76 When authority is delegated
in this manner, it is committed to the delegate’s discretion. By subdelegating a power with ﬁnality, the agency head effectively gives up control.
Nevertheless, ﬁnal subdelegations are pervasive in the real world.
The SEC’s Director of Enforcement, as will be discussed, currently
exercises the Commission’s subpoena authority.77 The Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) is generally not reviewed by the Attorney General who
delegated to the OLC the authority to issue executive branch legal
opinions.78 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) used to exercise
delegated rulemaking authority independently from the Department of

70. Id.
71. Id. at 286.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(c)).
74. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F. 3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g
en banc granted, 832 F. 3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
75. Cf. Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology
of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress, 56 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 341, 345–46 (2012) (ﬁnding that
“political appointees are ideologically distinctive from career executives”).
76. Dessein, supra note 65, at 811.
77. See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 246–249 and accompanying text (noting how the Office of Legal
Counsel is perceived as an independent entity of the Department of Justice’s Attorney
General).
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HHS.79 The puzzle here is to explain why. Of course, agency heads, no
less than other political actors, do not seek to maximize their power but
rather to optimize it.80 Sometimes, in other words, it is beneﬁcial for
those in control to cede that control.
On the one hand, doing so can free up resources to pursue higherpriority tasks. By declining decisionmaking authority, agency heads can
focus their attention on more important matters. At the same time,
subdelegating that authority to others can also be valuable in its own
right. When the recipient of the delegation is more expert on a relevant
matter, subdelegation can result in better-informed decisions. Indeed, in
many ways, high-quality information is the bureaucracy’s raison d’être.81
Assigning decision rights within the agency can take advantage of knowledge dispersed within the organization.82 It can also encourage appointees
and civil servants alike to develop more specialized expertise.83
Indeed, social scientists have long recognized that an important
function of delegation is to motivate effort and information acquisition.84
79. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (noting the historical presumption
that the FDA was independent of HHS despite being in the same agency).
80. See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and
Constraints 88–92 (2000) [hereinafter Elster, Ulysses Unbound] (exploring the “proposition
that sometimes less is more or, more speciﬁcally, that sometimes there are beneﬁts from
having fewer opportunities rather than more”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B.
Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 601 (2010)
(“[T]he President does not always have a political interest in seeking maximum control of
regulatory policy.”); Magill, supra note 51, at 860 (“Individuals, ﬁrms, governments, and,
yes, of course, bureaucracies—especially bureaucracies—will sometimes have an interest in
voluntarily limiting their options.”).
81. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Learning While Governing 2 (2013) [hereinafter
Gailmard & Patty, Learning] (“Yet for all the accountability problems it presents, the value
of high-quality information in bureaucracies cannot be seriously doubted.”).
82. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Speciﬁc and General Knowledge,
and Organizational Structure 1 (1990), http://ssrn.com/abstract=6658 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“[G]etting speciﬁc knowledge used in decision-making requires
decentralizing many decision rights in . . . ﬁrms.”).
83. See generally Gailmard & Patty, Learning, supra note 81, at 25–27 (“We argue
that incentives for administrative actors [like bureaucrats] to acquire policy expertise
result from the organizational structure and political position they occupy as created by
political principals . . . .”); Magill, supra note 51, at 890 (“[S]elf-regulatory measures can
be used to establish and delegate to entities that will produce . . . information and then
invest in becoming experts—working groups, advisory committees, and the like.”);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise,
23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 469, 471–73 (2007) [hereinafter Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision
Costs] (discussing various models of agency incentives to develop endogenous expertise).
84. See, e.g., Gailmard & Patty, Learning, supra note 81, at 25–28 (explaining how
policy discretion can “induce expertise development”); Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole,
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 3 (1997) (“[T]ransfer of
formal authority to an agent credibly increases the agent’s initiative or incentive to acquire
information.”); Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory
Review, 43 J. Legal Stud. 95, 95–101 (2014) (examining how delegation can generate
costly information subject to risks of shirking and bias); Matthew C. Stephenson,
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This intuition has driven theories, for example, of why Congress restricts
its own ability to amend internal committee proposals85 and why ﬁrm
managers delegate to employees.86 Administrative law scholars, of course,
are also familiar with the concept that Congress grants agencies discretion to capitalize on their expertise.87 The unifying insight is that principals are willing to trade off control for information.88 Congress resists the
ability to revise committee bills in order to encourage data gathering.
Firm managers empower employees to spur the same goal.89 So too with
agency heads. They are willing to accept the risks of ceding authority to
an actor with divergent preferences in exchange for better-informed
decisions.
Beyond its intuitive appeal, this account also has real-world resonance. Consider, for example, the SEC’s experience before and after it
subdeledated the Commission’s subpoena power. Beforehand, SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox had used a “cumbersome” review process to
approve each and every exercise of the power.90 During this review, he
required the enforcement staff to ﬂy in and physically present the case to
Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1423, 1422–27 (2011)
[hereinafter Stephenson, Information Acquisition] (examining “how different institutional
arrangements . . . might affect the production of useful information by government
agents”); see also infra note 85 (providing additional sources addressing delegation as a
motivator of effort and information gathering).
85. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 5, at 14--18 (providing an overview of
informational theories of legislative organization); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel,
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, 33 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 459, 459–63 (1989); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective
Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive
Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 287, 287 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Technology, Information, and the Decentralization
of the Firm, 4 Q.J. Econ. 1759, 1759 (2007).
87. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 372–73 (2010).
88. See Bendor et al., Theories of Delegation, supra note 4, at 242 (describing what is
“generally regarded as the major trade-off facing the boss: Is the gain produced by
delegating the decision to a more informed party worth the loss produced by having
someone with different preferences make the choice”); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 82,
at 1–3 (discussing how principals assign decisionmaking rights to agents and how the costs
of transferring information between agents inﬂuences the organization of markets and
ﬁrms); Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 84, at 1440 (“When deciding how
much discretion to delegate . . . the principal must weigh the potential informational gains
of delegation against the costs associated with potential agency bias.”).
89. See Diego Stea, Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, A Neglected Role for Organizational
Design: Supporting the Credibility of Delegation in Organizations, 4 J. Org. Design 3, 3
(2015) (noting research “recognize[s] that delegating discretion to employees can foster
organizational value creation” by “economizing on scarce managerial attention and allowing
for efficient use of local knowledge” and “increas[ing] the autonomous motivation of
employees”).
90. Zachary A. Goldfarb, In Cox Years at the SEC, Policies Undercut Enforcement
Efforts, Wash. Post (June 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/05/31/AR2009053102254.html [http://perma.cc/HN5F-DTTW].
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commissioners in Washington, D.C., even if the staff members were based
in New York or California.91 He also often “postponed . . . [enforcement]
decisions at the last minute, leaving cases unresolved for months,” only
to eventually weaken the proposed sanctions.92 According to several
career enforcement lawyers, Chairman Cox’s review “practices had a
chilling effect.”93 In one lawyer’s words:
The presentation of cases is the culmination of the
investigative process. When that process is interrupted, delayed
or denied, it can’t help but have a negative impact on the
people who conduct those investigations . . . . Clearly some
people wonder, ‘If they don’t want these kinds of cases, why
should I bother doing them even though they’re very
important?’94
As a result, many SEC enforcement officials had stopped investing their
time and effort in developing cases to pursue.95 Chairman Cox’s use of a
reviewable subdelegation is thus arguably an example of how such an
approach can reduce employees’ incentives and motivation to invest
resources.
The internal dynamics of the SEC, however, changed in 2009 with
the arrival of Chairwoman Mary Schapiro. An Obama appointee eager to
take the “handcuffs” off the enforcement division, Chairwoman Schapiro’s
preferences were more closely aligned with those of her enforcement
staff.96 She thus spearheaded an effort to subdelegate the Commission’s
authority to issue “formal orders of investigation” to the SEC’s Director
of Enforcement.97 Such authority could now be exercised without commissioner approval or cumbersome review.98 The SEC’s Director of
Enforcement Robert Khuzamii then announced in a speech that he was
further redelegating that authority to the career staff. In his words, “staff
will no longer have to obtain advance Commission approval in most cases
to issue subpoenas; instead, they will simply need approval from their

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James T. Coffman, former assistant
director of the SEC Division of Enforcement).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Delegation of Authority to Director of Division of Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,068, 40,068 (Aug. 11, 2009) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
98. Id. Such orders are practically signiﬁcant because they empower investigators to
issue judicially enforceable subpoenas compelling companies to turn over documents and
give sworn testimony instead of forcing them to rely solely on voluntary cooperation. See
Russell G. Ryan, Delegation and Accountability at the SEC, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance & Fin. Reg. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/10/07/
delegation-and-accountability-at-the-sec/ [http://perma.cc/F3D8-E5KZ].
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senior supervisor.”99 Practically speaking, Director Khuzamii continued,
“[t]his means that if defense counsel resist the voluntary production of
documents or witnesses, or fail to be complete and timely in responses or
engage in dilatory tactics, there will very likely . . . be a subpoena on your
desk the next morning.”100
Pursuant to these subdelegations, the SEC’s tenure-protected career
staff could now exercise the agency’s subpoena authority with minimal
oversight. As a result, the number of formal orders issued by the staff
nearly doubled from 2008 to 2012.101 In this manner, the SEC’s switch
from a reviewable to a near-ﬁnal subdelegation likely helped motivate its
subordinates to invest more effort in acquiring information about illegal
securities violations. Because subordinates no longer had to seek full
Commission review of their decisions, they could devote more informationgathering resources with little fear of reversal.
B.

Information Production and Transmission

Nevertheless, the observation remains that agency heads—like the
SEC Commissioners under Cox’s chairmanship—still gained some information on which ﬁrms had likely committed securities violations, even
when the enforcement staff acted as advisors rather than authorities.102
In other words, even when SEC staff members were subject to Commission
review, they presented evidence about potential enforcement cases, even if
the research was more limited or less accurate than it might otherwise
have been under subdelegated authority. Agency heads, however, face at
least two different kinds of challenges regarding such research, the ﬁrst
regarding its quality and the other pertaining to its review. Both challenges are distinct kinds of transaction costs associated with information
transmission, which in turn yield important implications for information
production within bureaucracies.103
99. See Robert Khuzamii, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by
SEC Staff: Remarks Before the New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of
Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm
[http://perma.cc/DMV2-GN8M] (announcing “inten[t] to delegate [delegated subpoena]
authority to senior officers throughout the Division” so that the “staff will no longer have
to obtain advance Commission approval in most cases to issue subpoenas; instead, they will
simply need approval from their senior supervisor”).
100. Id.
101. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Official Says Staff May Have Too Much Power over
Subpoenas, Reuters (Nov. 22, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-secpiwowar-subpoenas-idUSBRE9AL12G20131122 [http://perma.cc/U4BS-V87S].
102. See Goldfarb, supra note 90 (describing how Chairman Cox and commissioners
reviewed cases presented by SEC enforcement officials before reducing recommended
penalties).
103. See Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 79
(1992) (observing “[w]here different parts of the organization have responsibility for
different pieces of information . . . , [one would expect] some attempts to manipulate
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The ﬁrst problem for agency heads is that it is not always in the staff
members’ interest to reveal their private information or gain enough
information to make a precise assessment. Doing so may lead an agency
head to make a decision with which the staff member disagrees, especially when their preferences diverge.104 Say, for example, a civil servant
at the EPA reads two public comments or reports regarding the effects of
climate change with opposing viewpoints. Cognitive heuristics and bias
can lead her to report conclusions in line with her prior beliefs without
presenting contradicting evidence or highlighting relevant uncertainties
to the EPA Administrator. As such, when agency heads review a subordinate’s decision without being able to independently evaluate and verify
the basis upon which the recommendation was made, the subordinate
has an incentive to misrepresent the underlying information.105
At the same time, agency heads are not naïve. They will act or not
act upon the advice of staff members given what they know (or think they
know) about their staff members’ preferences—what is often referred to
as the “ally principle.”106 Take again the continuing example of SEC
Chairman Cox’s tenure. A Republican, Chairman Cox was known to be
concerned with excessive regulatory enforcement, much to the chagrin
of his proenforcement career lawyers.107 Such lawyers thus had an
information as a device for manipulating the decision”); Lee J. Alston & William Gillespie,
Resource Coordination and Transaction Costs: A Framework for Analyzing the
Firm/Market Boundary, 11 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 191, 192 (1989) (developing a framework
for classifying transaction costs and noting that “the types of transaction costs encountered
in organizing production vary across the factors of production and over the stages of the
production process” (emphasis omitted)).
104. In addition to policy bias, another concern for principals is the incentive for their
agents to shirk—to exert a sub-optimal amount of effort gathering costly information. See
Bubb & Warren, supra note 84, at 96. Shirking is of particular concern when the agent
cannot beneﬁt fully from her decision. Id. Such a prospect is likely to lead agency heads to
choose more biased agents. Id. (arguing that principals often choose biased delegates
since “policy bias can be harnessed to mitigate the problem of shirking”). The analysis
here, however, assumes that agency subordinates fully beneﬁt from the consequences of
the agency’s decision under subdelegated authority.
105. See Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 84, at 1457. This condition
of “oversight without transparency” contrasts with other contexts in which the reviewer
has “full transparency” with regard to the subordinate’s underlying evidence or when the
reviewer can simply observe the subordinate’s research efforts. Id. While these latter cases
may apply to certain reviewable subdelegations in agencies, the analysis here assumes (as is
usually the case) that the underlying recommendations are presented in some form to the
agency head, whether verbally in a meeting or by written memos or brieﬁngs. For work
examining “under what circumstances a principal, operationalized as an overseer with the
power to invalidate agent policy choices, would prefer to observe the policy proposed by
an agent whose expertise, ability, and policy preferences are all known,” see John W. Patty
& Ian R. Turner, Ex Post Review and Expert Policymaking: When Does Oversight
Reduce Accountability? 3 (Jan. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2781750 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
106. See Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 84, at 1440.
107. See Goldfarb, supra note 90.
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incentive to overstate the strength of a case in the hopes of convincing
Chairman Cox to pursue it. Agency heads like Chairman Cox thus had
reason to dismiss such information as “cheap talk”: recommendations
that are not credible to the skeptical receiver.108 More generally, when
agency heads suspect that recommending staff members or political
underlings are biased in the sense of having divergent preferences, they
will discount the recommendations accordingly.
In other contexts, these game-theoretic dynamics have inspired a
rich literature on strategic communication.109 One insight from this work
is that when preferences sufficiently diverge, information cannot be
conveyed reliably within an organization.110 Put more colloquially, when
bosses sufficiently distrust their subordinates, they ignore their subordinates’ advice. Conversely, as preferences become more aligned, the
amount of information that can be credibly conveyed increases.111 Within
a limited range of preference divergence, informative communication
can thus take place; it is in the interests of the sender, that is, to reveal
genuine information and the receiver will act accordingly. Under these
circumstances, principals—like agency heads—would prefer to delegate
to their agents rather than to engage in costly strategic communication.112 When preferences are sufficiently aligned, in other words, agency
heads would prefer ﬁnal rather than reviewable subdelegation.
The underlying logic is straightforward: Final subdelegation represents a commitment to let a subordinate beneﬁt from any expertise
gained. Such delegation therefore creates the strongest incentive for the
subordinate to develop private information. By contrast, if the subordinate is subject to reversal, she will be less inclined to acquire information
when it is costly do so. The agency head thus beneﬁts the most from ﬁnal
subdelegation as long as the bias is within a range in which informative
communication could have otherwise occurred. Final delegation allows
the agency head to avoid the costs of strategic communication while
maximizing the beneﬁts of the subordinate’s private information. In this
sense, the agency head’s decision to subdelegate can be understood as a
trade-off between informed-but-biased decisions (under a ﬁnal subdelegation) and noisy-but-unbiased decisions (under a reviewable subdelegation).
The EPA’s enumerated delegation practices help to illustrate. The
EPA currently documents all of its subdelegations in a Delegations
108. See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 116
(1996) (“Cheap talk consists of costless, nonbinding, nonveriﬁable messages that may
affect the listener’s beliefs.”).
109. The seminal work in this literature is Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic
Information Transmission, 50 Econometrica 1431 (1982).
110. See id. at 1450.
111. See id.
112. See Dessein, supra note 65, at 811; Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra
note 84, at 1459.
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Manual, which, in its own words, serves as the “legal record of the
authority of an Agency employee or representative to act on behalf of the
Administrator.”113 The manual speciﬁes a number of criteria EPA administrators should use in considering whether or not to delegate authority.114
Revealingly, one general principle is that “authority and accountability
should rest as close as possible to where the covered action takes place”
within the organization.115 If the action affects regional or local actions,
for example, the manual states that responsibility should be delegated to
a Regional Administrator.116 Indeed, doing so would encourage the
Regional Administrator to develop more location-speciﬁc expertise. Similarly, issues that affect a single substantive program within an agency—for
example, air pollution or hazardous waste—also merit subdelegation in
the EPA’s view. This policy again makes sense from an informational perspective: Agency heads gain better decisions from motivated subjectmatter experts.
Final subdelegations, however, would only make sense for the EPA
Administrator within a limited range of potential preference divergence.
Otherwise, the Administrator is better off with a reviewable subdelegation so as to maintain control. Put differently, when the potential costs of
bias outweigh the costs of review, agency heads will be more hesitant to
delegate. This dynamic is reﬂected in the EPA’s attention to the scope of
the delegation—privileging delegations with limited discretion and thus
a bounded risk for bias, while discouraging those in which the risk is
higher.117 For instance, the EPA prioritizes “recurring” subdelegations.118
Recurring actions usually do not require much discretion, so their delegation is a low-risk matter. In contrast are subdelegations in which the
risks of preference divergence are so great that the Administrator would
do well not to delegate in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, the manual states that
113. U.S. EPA, Introduction, para. 1, in U.S. EPA, EPA Delegations Manual [hereinafter
EPA Delegations Manual Introduction] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). As the
manual further explains:
The laws, Executive Orders and regulations which give EPA its authority
typically, but not always, indicate that “the Administrator shall” exercise
certain authorities. Official delegations of authority represent the basic
direction to senior Headquarters and Regional management officials to
exercise these delegated authorities. It is EPA’s policy that, in order for
other Agency management officials to act on behalf of the Administrator,
the authority granted by Congress or the Executive Branch must be
delegated officially . . . through the Agency’s delegation process.
Id.
114. Id. para. 3(a).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. (noting standard setting and rulemaking should remain with the
Administrator but processes that “may be more manageable at lower organizational levels”
may be delegated with sufficient guidance).
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“[i]f action under the authority is likely to set legal or programmatic
precedents, it should remain with the Administrator or Assistant
Administrator(s).”119 These actions include “rulemaking and standardsetting which set long-term commitments for the Agency.”120 However,
even these responsibilities are delegable if “sufficient guidance exists to
assure program consistency.”121 Put differently, when discretion is adequately constrained, subdelegation is more desirable since the risks of bias
are limited.
Taking a step back, note that this motivational account is most
plausible only when the agency head’s preferences are transparent to the
subordinate ex ante, as was the case within the SEC’s enforcement division.122 The extent to which the subordinate knows in advance how the
agency head is likely to act upon being given information is itself an
important factor in deciding how much time and effort to exert when
gathering that information. When the subordinate knows, for instance,
that the agency head has sufficiently divergent preferences such that the
subordinate’s recommendation is likely to be treated as cheap talk, then
the subordinate lacks the incentive to gather that information in the ﬁrst
place.123 To illustrate, since SEC investigators knew that Chairman Cox
had an antienforcement agenda and would likely discount their views,
they were understandably less motivated to develop the underlying cases.
By contrast, if Chairman Cox’s preferences were nontransparent or more
closely aligned, then the marginal incentive to engage in information
gathering could actually be higher, since the staff might work harder in
the hopes of persuading Chairman Cox to proceed.
In addition to the information loss from strategic communication,
the agency head must also consider the organizational transaction costs
associated with reviewing the work of their subordinates.124 Most, if not
all, administrative agencies operate according to vertical hierarchies requiring structures and processes to facilitate the ratiﬁcation or rejection
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Goldfarb, supra note 90. This insight is related to, though distinct from,
conditions that Professors Gailmard and Patty refer to as “top-down transparency” situations
in which subordinates have access to the principal’s information prior to making their own
recommendation. See Gailmard & Patty, Giving Advice, supra note 65, at 5–6 (deﬁning
“top-down transparency” as conditions in which “the agent has access to the principal’s
information prior to making his or her own policy and/or message choices”).
123. See Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 84, at 1459 (noting that “if
the principal and agent have such different preferences that the principal will disregard
any report by the agent, then the agent has no incentive whatsoever to acquire information,
since this information will always be ignored”).
124. Such costs may be understood as a species of “decision costs.” See Stephenson,
Bureaucratic Decision Costs, supra note 83 at 20. Understanding them as transaction costs,
however, helps to draw the connection to insights form the theory of the firm and a broader
organization literature.

2017]

SUBDELEGATING POWERS

495

of decisions made below. Many agencies, for example, have multiple
layers of adjudicators with ALJs or other hearing officers at the bottom,
whose judgments are then reviewable by an internal appellate body and
sometimes the agency heads as well.125 These review processes are costly,
both for litigants and the agency. Indeed, pages of the CFR and Federal
Register are devoted to detailed and often complex rules regarding agencies’ internal review and appeals processes.126
In reality, agency heads can revise these procedures as a means of
controlling wayward subordinates.127 For simplicity’s sake, however, such
transaction costs will be treated exogenously here. Assume, in other
words, that these review costs are inﬂuenced by factors independent of
the main variables considered thus far: agency-head and subordinate preferences.128 This assumption, in turn, has some real-world bite. Internal
review processes are often ﬁxed by statute, executive order, or sheer
institutional path dependence.129 For example, many agency heads inherit
internal clearance procedures from their predecessors.130 These procedures require multiple internal officers to review and sign off on a staff
recommendation before the decision is approved by the agency head.131
Each stage of this process imposes substantial transaction costs that the
125. For example, EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board “hears permit and civil penalty
appeals in accordance with regulations delegating this authority from the EPA Administrator.”
About the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), Envtl. Prot. Agency, http:/www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/about-environmental-appeals-board-eab [http://perma.cc/MK46-57QF] (last visited
Jan. 16, 2017). The Social Security Administration has an internal Appeals Council that
“may grant, deny, or dismiss a request for review” and then, if review is granted, “either
decide the case or return . . . it to an administrative law judge for a new decision.” Brief
History and Current Information About the Appeals Council, Soc. Sec. Admin., http://
www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_ac.html [http://perma.cc/D4W7-U7PD] (last visited Jan. 16,
2017). The Department of Agriculture’s National Appeals Division “reports directly to the
Secretary of Agriculture” and works “to provide fair and timely hearings and appeals to
USDA program participants.” National Appeals Div., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., http://
www.nad.usda.gov/ [http://perma.cc/AA37-V2KN] (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
126. For the Social Security Administration’s hearing and appeals process, for example,
see Procedures of the Departmental Grant Appeals Board, 45 C.F.R. §§ 16.1–.23 (1981).
127. See Nou, supra note 11, at 440 (“Principal-agent problems often arise because of
information asymmetries, and, in this respect, efforts to reduce internal informationacquisition costs can also help mitigate potential agency problems.”).
128. Alternatively, transaction costs could also be treated endogenously, which would
complicate the theory in ways not addressed here. SEC Chairman Cox, recall, required
enforcement staff members to ﬂy to Washington, D.C., and orally present cases for full
commission review—a process which imposed high transaction costs. See supra note 91
and accompanying text. One rationale for doing so may have been to decrease the
ultimate number of enforcement cases pursued in line with Chairman Cox’s preferences.
See supra notes 93–95.
129. See Nou, supra note 11, at 473–78 (providing examples of path-dependent
coordination mechanisms as well as “mandatory design requirements” imposed by the
President and Congress).
130. Id. at 468–71 (discussing internal clearance procedures).
131. Id.
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agency head must bear when choosing to review a lower-level official’s
recommendation.
As such, the agency head’s subdelegation decision now becomes a
function of two different kinds of costs: the information losses due to
cheap talk as well as the transaction costs of review. The former category
will vary depending on the expected preference divergence of the subordinate, while the latter will depend on exogenous factors that can
increase or decrease how expensive it becomes for an agency to engage
in intra-agency review. The agency head will thus choose a reviewable
rather than a ﬁnal subdelegation when she expects the review to result in
a decision that she prefers, net the transaction costs of reviewing that
decision. Conversely, the agency head would prefer to subdelegate the
decision entirely as long as the expected preference divergence is
sufficiently limited; doing so would eliminate the costs of internal review.
***
In sum, agency subdelegation practices can be explained as mechanisms that allow agency heads to capitalize on expertise developed by
lower-level officials within an agency. To generate such expertise, agency
heads can either treat their subordinates as authorities or advisors. They
can extend either reviewable or ﬁnal grants of authority. This decision, in
turn, will be a function of two factors: the expected preference divergence of the delegate and the internal costs of review. The greater the
preference divergence, the more hesitant the agency head will be to extend ﬁnal authority. At the same time, delegating this authority becomes
more attractive as the exogenous transaction costs of intra-agency review
increase. Because subdelegation eliminates those costs, it becomes a more
efficient means of agency decisionmaking.
II. CREDIBILITY AS A CONTINUUM
While the previous Part presented the agency head’s decision as a
simpliﬁed choice between a reviewable and a ﬁnal subdelegation, in
practice, the range of internal delegation choices is more accurately
described along a continuum—a continuum of credibility. At one end
are reviewable subdelegations, which are noncredible, and on the other
are perfectly credible ﬁnal subdelegations. Reviewable subdelegations are
noncredible in the sense that the recipient knows that the agency head
can overrule her decision. Final subdelegations, by contrast, are more
credible in that the recipient has reason to believe that the agency head
will not do so. Between these two analytic poles are a host of institutional
design choices that agency heads can use to make a subdelegation more
or less credible. These internal choices exist independently of the ability
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of external actors like courts to serve a credibility-enhancing function (an
issue that will be discussed later).132
Indeed, the informational beneﬁts of subdelegation only arise when
those delegations are dependable. To conﬁdently invest time and resources in their decisions, agents must be able to rely on a subdelegation
and know that their efforts are not all for naught. The ability of agency
heads to spur information production through subdelegation thus requires a credible commitment. By contrast, when the subdelegation is
not reliable the agent will be less willing to invest time and resources due
to the fear that the resulting decision will be overruled.133 Of course,
subdelegations are “loaned, not owned.”134 Those who labor under them
always face the risk that their power will be revoked. In a more dynamic,
multi-stage game between agency heads and their subdelegates, this
threat likely looms large. Those revocations, however, entail procedural
or political costs that are often prohibitive in practice.135
This Part now explores how the agency head chooses to subdelegate
rather than whether to do so. The ﬁrst section, more speciﬁcally, explains
why credibility matters more within, as opposed to between, different
institutions. The second section then provides a taxonomy of commitmentenhancing design choices. These options include increased reputational
backing, transparency, longevity, dissolution, and, ﬁnally, entrenchment.
A.

Institutionalizing Commitment

Public law and legal theory scholars have long puzzled over how and
why political actors engage in precommitment.136 The question has
132. See infra section III.A.
133. See Stea et al., supra note 89, at 4 (“Employees who believe that managers’
explicit or implicit promises of delegated discretion are not credible will fear that, after
having mobilized a high degree of motivation in carrying out their tasks, they may face . . .
opportunistic reneging on the part of managers . . . leading to smaller contributions of
effort . . . .”).
134. George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Informal Authority in
Organizations, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 56, 56 (1999).
135. See, e.g., infra notes 186–190 and accompanying text (describing the costly
internal process to change subdelegations at EPA).
136. See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities
and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1754 (2003) (“When
precommitting himself, a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some
later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have performed without that
prior act.”); see also Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and
Irrationality 88–103 (1979) (analyzing political precommitment by examining the phenomenon in various democracies); Elster, Ulysses Unbound, supra note 80, at 88–174
(analyzing the justiﬁcations for constitutions as political precommitments); John Ferejohn
& Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1929–31
(2003) (discussing different justiﬁcations for constitutional precommitments); Jon D.
Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security
Domains and Beyond, 97 Va. L. Rev. 801, 804–27 (2011) (analyzing case studies in how
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understandably occupied constitutionalists in particular—those grappling
with a mere “parchment” document that self-interested individuals create
to bind themselves.137 The commitment problem arises because political
actors must restrain their ambitions in order to beneﬁt from the stability
and protections constitutions can provide. Credible commitment by
agency heads to their own subordinates, however, arguably implicates a
different form of authority and thus a distinct set of considerations.
While constitutional authority might be understood as democratic in
nature138—that is, concerned with the legitimate exercise of collective
coercion over third parties—intra-agency authority is managerial in
form.139
Managerial authority is, for lack of a more precise word, authoritarian.140 It operates not from democratic premises but rather by “ﬁat.”141
“the Executive appears to expend considerable energy to disempower itself”); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 894–913
(2007) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Credible Executive] (describing “executive selfbinding” mechanisms that can increase executive credibility). See generally Daryl J.
Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
Harv. L. Rev. 657 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics] (exploring the
constitutional law implications of political precommitment and constraints).
137. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 136, at 662. In one familiar view,
the American Constitution facilitates credible commitments by establishing certain rights
like property protection and institutions like judicial review, which ultimately beneﬁt
otherwise short-sighted political actors. See Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 136, at 1929
(“Governments can be more effective in pursuing their own goals by committing
themselves to respecting certain rights (including property rights, of course, but other
rights as well) and institutions (such as an independent judiciary).”). Another prominent
perspective draws on James Madison’s notion that ambitions can “counteract” ambitions:
The Constitution created three autonomous, rivalrous actors to check and balance each
other in ways that preserve and ultimately expand their power. See Levinson, Parchment
and Politics, supra note 136, at 669–70 (“Madison’s strategy of constitutional design was to
create a set of structural arrangements that would selectively empower political decisionmakers
whose interests and incentives would tend to be in alignment with constitutional rights
and rules.”). Put differently, constitutions create self-entrenching powers and structures
reinforced by the incentives they generate for political actors. Id. at 663 (describing the
dynamic as that of “incentive compatibility”).
138. Max Weber refers to such authority as “rational-legal” authority.” See Max
Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 Berkeley Publications Soc’y & Institutions
1, 2–3 (Hans Gerth trans., 1958).
139. See Christopher McMahon, Managerial Authority, 100 Ethics 33, 35 (1989) (“It
seems clear that the conceptual apparatus of authority applies to relations between
managers and employees. Employees routinely subordinate their own judgment to that of
their employers.”).
140. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1697 (2001) (“The
choice between transacting in markets versus bringing transactions within firms is essentially
the choice between using contracts as a governing device versus using the authority
structure of the ﬁrm’s hierarchy.”); McMahon, supra note 139, at 35.
141. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 104 (2004) (“[W]hile markets allocate resources via the price
mechanism, corporations do so via fiat—i.e., authoritative direction.”); Oliver E. Williamson,
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Thus, credibility is even more tenuous in this context given the background
norms and a culture of obedience within ﬁrms and agencies. Employees,
for instance, are expected to “subordinate their own judgment to that of
their employers” even if they might otherwise disagree with it.142 This
distinction between political and managerial authority is arguably implicit
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA subjects binding
legislative rules to notice and comment but exempts rules of “agency
organization, procedure, or practice.”143 Rulemaking provisions more
generally do not apply in “matter[s] relating to agency management or
personnel.”144 Because managerial matters do not coerce third parties,
the APA does not subject them to the same externally legitimizing procedure.145 The authority of agency heads over their employees is assumed
to be unilateral.
Of course, the concept of managerial authority needs more reﬁnement in the administrative agency context. Unlike in private ﬁrms, many
agency employees are not employees at will but rather tenure protected.146
Their salaries, as discussed, are also politically shielded and compressed
within a uniform federal pay structure.147 Many agency employees are
thus not subject to traditional employment contracts. Even more so than
the incomplete contracts in traditional firms,148 agency heads usually
cannot contract either ex ante or ex post for optimal performance. As a
result, the credibility problem becomes even more acute for agency
heads who otherwise enjoy managerial authority.

The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 5 J. Reprints for
Antitrust L. & Econ. 321, 325 (1973) (observing that ﬁrms can resolve conﬂict through
“ﬁat”).
142. See McMahon, supra note 139, at 35 (“It seems clear that the conceptual apparatus
of authority applies to relations between managers and employees. Employees routinely
subordinate their own judgment to that of their employers.”); see also Herbert A. Simon,
Models of Man 184 (1957) (“W enters into an employment contract with B when the
former agrees to accept the authority of the latter and the latter agrees to pay the former a
stated wage (w).”). Ronald Coase contrasts the authority exercised within ﬁrms with that
of market-based free exchange and negotiation; the authority within ﬁrms is directive,
while the latter is bargain based. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica
386, 392 (1937) (“[T]he operation of a market costs something and by forming an
organisation and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources,
certain marketing costs are saved.”).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
144. Id. at § 553(a)(2).
145. Id. at §§ 553(a)–(b).
146. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
147. See Johnson & Libecap, supra note 62, at 5; Katyal, supra note 39, at 2331–32
(discussing “civil-service personnel policies”).
148. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Beneﬁts of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 716 (1986) (providing a
theory of ﬁrm ownership and vertical integration in terms of “when it is too costly for one
party to specify a long list of the particular rights it desires over another party’s assets”).
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Enhancing Commitment

This section thus turns to the ways in which agency heads have
enhanced the credibility of their delegations vis-à-vis their subordinates.
More speciﬁcally, it considers subdelegation’s institutional dimensions,
which individually or in combination can serve to reassure a subordinate
that her decision is less likely to be internally overruled. These design
choices include speciﬁcation, reputational backing, transparency, longevity, dissolution, and, ﬁnally, entrenchment.
1. Speciﬁcation. — Subdelegations, like contracts, specify their terms
and conditions. In particular, they often contain clear reservations of the
agency head’s ability to overrule a delegated decision. The EPA
Administrator, for instance, explicitly “retains the right to exercise or
withdraw, at any time, an authority which has been delegated.”149 By
contrast, the absence of such provisions can be read (as some judges
have done) as an implicit commitment to grant a subordinate the right
to make a ﬁnal decision.150 Most of the SEC’s subdelegations, for
example, declare that the SEC “hereby delegates, until the Commission
orders otherwise, the [speciﬁed] functions” to various internal agency
actors.151 In this manner, agency heads can explicitly or implicitly
delegate their authority credibly in the text of the subdelegation.
2. Reputation. — Reputations are important, especially to repeat
players. Repeat players deal continuously with the same people and can
thus develop a persona (artiﬁcial or real) that can work to or against
their advantage. Developing a reputation for reneging on promises, for
example, can diminish the value of all future assurances by rendering
them untrustworthy.152 Thus, even if reneging provides short-term benefits,
those beneﬁts can be outweighed by the long-term costs of being unable
to engage in believable future promises. Agency heads who deal repeatedly with the same career staff thus have an incentive to develop a reputation for delegating credibly. Doing so can maximize the informationgenerating value of existing and future subdelegations.
Put in more game-theoretic terms, assume an inﬁnitely repeated
game involving an agency head and subordinate, both of whom are risk
neutral.153 During each period, the subordinate investigates a project and
recommends that her boss accept or reject it. More concretely, say the
subordinate is charged with investigating the facts necessary to bring an
enforcement case in court. Assume that the agency head is perfectly
informed but lacks the resources to develop and initiate projects. She
149. EPA Delegations Manual Introduction, supra note 113, para. 2(a).
150. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 383–87 (1957).
151. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-1 (2016).
152. See Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically 142 (1991) (discussing the implications that can result from broken oral promises).
153. See Baker et al., supra note 134, at 56–57.
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may thus assign the investigatory task to a zealous internal lawyer. To
motivate this lawyer, the agency head promises the lawyer autonomy in
making enforcement decisions on behalf of the agency. If this assurance
is believable, the lawyer will invest more effort in searching for suitable
enforcement suits; after all, each additional hour spent on the case will
translate into results the lawyer wants.154
Consequently, the payoffs resulting from this extra motivation can
outweigh the expected costs of enforcement decisions that the agency
head would prefer not to have made.155 Since the agency head has the
information to assess an enforcement case before it is brought in court,
however, she will be tempted to renege on the promise by rejecting a
case not in her interest. As a result, the dominant strategy may be not to
delegate, even if doing so would be more efficient.156 However, if the
agency head values her reputation for delegating authority more than
the beneﬁts from reneging on her promise to ratify all proposals, then
delegation becomes the dominant strategy; in this sense, reputational
considerations render ﬁnal delegation “feasible.”157
But how do agency heads cultivate such reputations? One way is
simply through sustained practice. The longer an agency head does not
overrule her subordinate’s decisions, the more she will be perceived as
allowing her staff to make ﬁnal policy decisions. One illustration is the
historical dynamic between the Secretary of HHS and the Commissioner
of the FDA. For decades, the HHS Secretary had delegated her authority
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to the FDA Commissioner.158
As a result, “[a]n unbroken practice of deference to the FDA seemed to
have developed at the HHS level,” so much so that the “practice had
hardened into a convention.”159 The HHS Secretary thus had a reputation for not overturning the FDA Commissioner, which, as we will later
see, was sullied in the context of a decision involving emergency
contraceptives.
Agency heads can also develop reputations as lazy or otherwise
uninterested in nitty-gritty policy details. They may focus their attention
on raising public awareness or improving the agency’s standing by
traveling and giving public speeches rather than engaging in day-to-day
decisionmaking. Such administrators often gain reputations as delegators

154. Id. (discussing instances in which the assurance of autonomy motivates subordinate
actors).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 38 Fed. Reg. 6668, 6668–69 (Mar. 12, 1973)
(codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
159. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
1163, 1208 (2013).
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by default.160 Agency heads can also cultivate reputations for nonstrategic
reasons. In one Hobbesian view, the “weak bonds of words can be
strengthened in two ways: a fear of the consequence of breaking one’s
word; or a glory, or pride, in not breaking it.”161 In other words, agency
heads may continue to abide by a subdelegation from a sense of pride in
doing so—with the unintended consequence that doing so earns an
impression as a hands-off manager conﬁdent in her professional staff.
The EPA’s own delegations guidance states: “Show conﬁdence in the
redelegation decisions you make. Once decisions are redelegated, it is
important to demonstrate trust, integrity, and consistency toward redelegatees and the actions they take under the redelegations.”162 Regardless
of the underlying motivation, staff may rightly come to expect that their
recommendations will remain undisturbed.163
3. Transparency. — Another strategy agency heads can use to make
their subdelegations more credible is to make them more transparent.
Instead of being conﬁned to internal staff documents, training manuals,
or meeting minutes,164 internal delegations can be publicly memorialized. Such transparency enables monitors—political officials, lobbyists,
and interest groups—to become aware of the real power brokers within
an agency and invest their resources accordingly.165 The resulting
relationships, in turn, render it more likely that news of an internal
revocation or reversal of authority has occurred. These revelations can
then invite costly litigation or otherwise result in political sanctions.
Contrast the SEC, which routinely publishes its subdelegations in the
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations,166 with the EPA. As
discussed, the EPA records the bulk of its internal delegations in a
Delegations Manual hosted on an internal server.167 The manual is
160. See Robert A. Katzmann, Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission
and Antitrust Policy 104 (1980) (describing some commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission who prefer to “rely upon the recommendation of an attorney adviser or a
trusted colleague with whom they generally agree” in “less-than-signiﬁcant matters”).
161. See Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note 151, at 148 (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
71 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1651)).
162. See EPA, Delegations of Authority, supra note 29, at 4.
163. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 98 (“It’s no secret that the SEC commissioners already
approve nearly all staff requests for formal orders, appropriately deferring to the staff’s
judgment and familiarity with the facts warranting scrutiny.”).
164. See, e.g., Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing
how the National Labor Relationships Board assigned petition-granting authority to the
General Counsel during an internal agency meeting).
165. See Posner & Vermeule, Credible Executive, supra note 136, at 903 (discussing
“transparency as a way to reduce the costs to outsiders of monitoring . . . actions”).
166. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.30-1–.30-18 (2016) (identifying delegations of authority to
various SEC officials).
167. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.5(b) (2016) (“EPA’s Directives System contains deﬁnitive
statements of EPA’s organization, policies, procedures, assignments of responsibility, and
delegations of authority.”).
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unavailable to the public except through a time-consuming Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request or else a physical trip to the EPA’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., or one of the agency’s regional offices.168
By restricting public access in this manner, the EPA Administrator makes
it more difficult for outsiders to know who is actually making decisions
within the agency. Because these monitors are less likely to help enforce
subdelegations, EPA staff members are more likely to believe that their
decisions will be subject to internal review and potentially overruled. As a
result, the subdelegations are less credible for generating resource-intensive
information.
4. Longevity. — Internal delegations of authority can also vary in
terms of their temporal scope. Subdelegations with and without time
limits, however, have more complicated implications for credibility than
it may ﬁrst seem. As an initial matter, when an agency head delegates
indeﬁnitely, staff members are likely to view the delegation as more
reliable relative to delegations with an expiration date. Thus, for instance,
when the FCC subdelegated authority to its General Counsel to issue
“written determinations on matters regarding the interception of
telephone conversations,” the General Counsel had no prima facie reason to believe that her determinations would be second-guessed.169
By contrast, when the EPA Administrator issued a “temporary”
delegation to a regional administrator to approve or disapprove a
rulemaking petition for Wyoming aquifer exemptions,170 the regional
administrator knew that her authority was time-limited to the speciﬁc
petition at issue. Such an expiration date is akin to an advance notice of
the power’s revocation. If a subordinate understands that her authority
will expire at a given point in time, she is less likely to make long-term
investments in information acquisition. At the same time, however, the
subordinate may also have an even greater incentive to labor under a
temporary delegation if she believes her efforts may result in the extension of that authority. In other words, she may be more motivated to
invest the time and resources necessary to obtain the optimally informed
results if she thinks the delegation may become indeﬁnite, especially
when that information has increasing marginal returns.

168. Id. (“Copies [of EPA’s Directives System] are available for public inspection and
copying at the Management and Organization Division, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW.,
Washington, DC 20460. Information can be obtained from the Office of Public Affairs at
all Regional Offices.”). Barring such travel and time-consuming photocopying efforts, the
documents were available to the author only through a FOIA request.
169. 47 C.F.R. § 0.251(f) (2015).
170. See Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson on Approval of Temporary Delegation of
Authority to Propose a Rule Approving or Disapproving Certain Aquifer Exemptions in
Wyoming to James B. Martin, Adm’r of Region 8, 1 (June 25, 2012) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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To illustrate, consider once again the manner in which the SEC ﬁrst
delegated its authority to issue formal orders of investigation to the SEC’s
Director of Enforcement. In the SEC’s own words: “The Commission is
adopting this delegation for a one-year period, and at the end of the
period will evaluate whether to extend the delegation.”171 The subdelegation, in other words, was to sunset after a one-year trial period. The
stated purpose of this sunset provision was to “permit the Commission to
evaluate the Division’s use of the delegation and to consider whether
extension of the delegation was appropriate.”172 Explicit revisitation
language like this can incentivize information acquisition, even for temporary delegations. Indeed, after the enforcement staff almost doubled
the rate of enforcement actions, the SEC’s delegation was extended
indeﬁnitely.173
5. Dissolution. — Yet another way that delegations can be made more
credible is to dissolve, even if temporarily, the body making the delegation in the ﬁrst place. Doing so succeeds as a commitment device because
it renders an action irreversible in a sense: The actor that granted the
authority is no longer around to reverse it (or will not reconstitute itself
for an indefinite period of time).174 Last wills and testaments, for instance,
are credible because they cannot be revoked after death.175 Similarly,
when commissions and multimember boards delegate authority in anticipation of quorum-busting vacancies, these delegations are credible because
the agencies will lack a sufficient number of members to revoke them.
When Congress is gridlocked, the prospect of quick conﬁrmations of new
commissioners becomes even more remote. Recall, for example, the
Election Assistance Commission’s delegation to its Executive Director to
manage a federal voter registration form in anticipation of commissioner
vacancies.176 The subdelegation was credible to the Executive Director
because the Commission lacked a quorum to act shortly thereafter. Rely171. Delegation of Authority to Director of Division of Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,068 (Aug. 11, 2009) (to be codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
172. Delegation of Authority to the Director of Its Division of Enforcement, 75 Fed.
Reg. 49820 (Aug. 16, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
173. See id. The SEC gave the following rationale:
The Commission has determined that it is appropriate to extend the
Division’s authority to issue formal orders of investigation. In making
this determination, the Commission considered the increased efficiency
in the Division’s conduct of its investigations permitted by the delegation,
and the Division’s continued effective communication and coordination
in addressing pertinent legal and policy issues with other Commission
Divisions and Offices when formal order authority is invoked.
Id.
174. See Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note 152, at 151 (explaining that cutting off
communication serves as a credible commitment device).
175. Id.
176. Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014).
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ing on this subdelegation, the Director rejected Kansas’s and Arizona’s
requests to include proof-of-citizenship requirements—a decision that
was later upheld in court.177
6. Entrenchment. — Finally, agency heads can also make their subdelegations more credible by visibly entrenching them. Entrenchment is an
ambiguous concept, to be sure,178 but as deﬁned here, it refers to raising
the costs of reversing the delegation beyond those necessary to enact,
amend, or repeal it in the ﬁrst place.179 In other words, agency heads can
entrench a delegation by increasing the effort or expenditure necessary
to repeal or otherwise change it. In this sense, entrenchment lies along a
continuum from incremental increases in reversal costs to “absolute”
entrenchment, when the reversal costs are essentially inﬁnite and “the
right of repeal is denied for all time, under any conditions, and by
whatever procedure.”180 At the same time, the degree of entrenchment
must be ex ante visible to delegates—that is, perceivable before they
decide how much to invest in expertise. Otherwise, the strategy does not
effectively serve as a commitment mechanism.
As a baseline, consider that agency heads can subdelegate their
authority at low cost. For example, they have historically subdelegated
through highly informal means, and courts have upheld them when
doing so. Take a Ninth Circuit case involving the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).181 The National Labor Relations Act authorizes
the Board to petition a federal district court for appropriate relief upon
issuance of a complaint charging that any person has engaged or is
177. Id. at 1190–91.
178. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law,
125 Yale L.J. 400, 408 (2015) (“Political ‘entrenchment’ is discussed more often than it is
deﬁned, and it is not clear that any single deﬁnition captures all uses of the term.”); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J.
1665, 1666 (2002) (“‘Entrenchment’ is a promiscuous word in the academic literature.”).
179. See Mendelson, Agency Burrowing, supra note 38, at 589 (characterizing
“[a]dministrative policy entrenchment” as “a decision [that] is likely to be reversible at
least as a procedural matter, [but] it is probable that the change will be costly” (footnote
omitted)); see also Levinson & Sachs, supra note 178, at 408 (“At the most general level,
‘entrenchment’ means that political change has been made more difficult than it
otherwise would (or should) be.”). Professors Daryl Levinson and Benjamin Sachs’s
deﬁnition can be understood to be concerned with the increase in political costs necessary
to change something relative to the costs of the status quo—what they more generally
refer to as “functional” entrenchment. Id. at 407; see also Christopher Serkin, Public
Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879,
888 (2011) (“[A]n action is entrenching to the extent that it limits the policy choices
available to future governments.”).
180. Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 12 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379, 384 (1987); see also Anupam Chander, Note,
Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101
Yale L.J. 457, 462 (1991) (observing that “[a]bsolute entrenchment renders the entrenched
rule permanent and immutable” (emphasis omitted)).
181. Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 2011).
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engaged in an “unfair labor practice.”182 In 2007, the NLRB subdelegated this authority to its General Counsel—through a vote recorded
only in a meeting’s minutes.183 This means of delegation had very low
transaction costs and did not inﬂuence the court’s eventual conclusion
that the delegation was legal.184
Relative to this baseline, agency heads can ﬁrst entrench their
delegations by increasing the procedural burden associated with amending or repealing them.185 Agency heads could, for example, impose an
expensive internal approval process to help embed already-existing subdelegations (i.e., those previously imposed without this costly review). To
illustrate, the EPA started to require a time-consuming clearance procedure before its internal delegations could be changed.186 Under this
scheme, the office requesting the revised subdelegation must ﬁrst consult
with the EPA’s Human Capital Planning and Policy Division to ensure no
conﬂicts.187 Then it must prepare a transmittal memo justifying the new
delegation and specifying its scope and limitations.188 The proposal must
then go through an intra-agency comment process in which other
interested offices review the change.189 During this process, other offices
can also raise concerns and negotiate any amendments to the subdelegation.190 This time-consuming process can entrench preexisting delegations
by rendering them more costly to revise, particularly given extant resource
constraints.
Beyond raising procedural costs, agency heads can also functionally
entrench a delegation by empowering actors to mobilize supporters and
other interest groups to fend off subsequent attempts at repeal.191 The
credibility of such delegations increases because the subdelegate knows
she will now have allies that can help prevent an agency head’s attempts
182. Id. at 1340.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1354.
185. See Magill, supra note 51, at 894 (“[A]n agency could use a self-regulatory
measure to rearrange a decisionmaking process in a way that will entrench existing policy.”).
186. See EPA Delegations Manual Introduction, supra note 113, para. 3.
187. Id. para 3(a).
188. Id. para. 3(c).
189. Id. para 3.
190. Id.
191. See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 178, at 429–30 (describing methods of
“functional” entrenchment involving “strengthening political allies or weakening political
opponents,” “changing the composition of the political community,” and “empowering a
different governmental institution and consequently a different set of political actors and
groups”); Magill, supra note 51, at 894 (noting agency heads “could empower an internal
agency unit with predictable views to be in charge of the agency choice,” thus rendering it
“more difficult for political opponents to oppose the effort or to dislodge it once it is in
place”); Posner & Vermeule, Credible Executive, supra note 136, at 896 (referring to
“informal” means of self-binding in terms of increased “political costs”).
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to overrule her judgment. A revealing example is the 2011 decision by
HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius to overrule FDA Commissioner Margaret
Hamburg’s decision regarding the emergency contraceptive Plan B.192
Commissioner Hamburg had labored under subdelegated authority193 to
determine that Plan B was safe and effective for over-the-counter use. For
decades, as discussed, the HHS Secretary had explicitly subdelegated the
authority to make such determinations under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to the FDA Commissioner.194 As a result, the FDA Commissioner
had a number of allies and interest groups ready to support her conclusions.195 Indeed, the ensuing public outcry and eventual litigation that
resulted in the overturning of Secretary Sebelius’s decision attest to the
functionally entrenched nature of the subdelegation.196
C.

Applications

This Part has thus far developed some of the conceptual resources
necessary to advance a positive theory for why and how agency heads
subdelegate. The main argument has been that the extent to which an
agency head credibly commits to a delegation is a function of two main
variables: the expected preference divergence with the subdelegate and
the relative transaction costs of internal advice giving. Thus, one would
expect to see institutional variations in credibility as a result of changes
along either dimension, holding all else constant. While the previous
discussion used a variety of examples to illustrate the plausibility of these
claims, this section now seeks to apply the theory in further contexts and
explore some resulting hypotheses.
Perhaps most obviously, partisan changes in presidential administrations should result in changes to the credibility of previously delegated
authorities. When Democrat-appointed agency heads in agencies with left192. See Gardiner Harris, Plan to Widen Availability of Morning-After Pill Is Rejected,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/health/policy/sebeliusoverrules-fda-on-freer-sale-of-emergency-contraceptives.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
193. Delegations from the Secretary of Health and Human Services to the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1) (2004); accord 2 FDA, SMG 1410.10, FDA Staff
Manual Guides—Delegations of Authority para 1(A)(1) (2016), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/UCM273771.pdf (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
194. See supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
dynamic between the HHS Secretary and the FDA Commissioner).
195. See Cole Petrochko, Groups Ask HHS to Rethink Plan B Ruling, Medpage Today
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.medpagetoday.com/obgyn/pregnancy/36580 [http://perma.cc/
A566-BWPN] (describing various groups’ opposition to the HHS Plan B decision).
196. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing
the unprecedented nature of the Secretary’s action in “overru[ling] the FDA in an area
which Congress entrusted primarily to the FDA . . . and which fell within the scope of the
authority that the Secretary expressly delegated to the Commissioner”).
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leaning careerists—such as the EPA, HHS, and Department of Labor—
are replaced by Republican appointees,197 for example, one would expect
either less credible subdelegations or their revocation altogether. Alternatively, one might expect new agency heads to redelegate their authority
to other agents within the agency with closer preferences.
To illustrate, return again to the Clinton Secretary of Commerce’s
proposed rule to grant power to the Census Director to use statistical
sampling when determining population measures. Recall that such sampling was known to likely help Democrats given that it would result in
greater counts of minorities. Despite an adverse court ruling and opposition from congressional Republicans, the Clinton Administration finalized
the rule on October 6, 2000—shortly before the presidential election
that year.198 The rule was published in the Federal Register and stated
that “[t]he Director of the Census shall make the ﬁnal determination”
regarding population measures.199 It further specified that “[t]he
determination of the Director of the Census shall not be subject to review,
reconsideration, or reversal by the Secretary of Commerce.”200 In this
manner, a Democratic agency head subdelegated ﬁnal authority in a
clearly specified and transparent manner to a subordinate he knew shared
his preferences. Doing so helped to ensure that the Director invested
effort in the determination.
After the 2000 presidential contest resulted in George W. Bush’s
election, however, a new ﬂeet of Republican political appointees swept
into power. In particular, President Bush chose Donald Evans to be his
Secretary of Commerce, a loyalist who had served as chairman of Bush’s
presidential campaign.201 On February 23, 2001, Secretary Evans issued a
new ﬁnal rule revoking the subdelegated authority.202 His preferences
were now misaligned with those of the acting Census Director, a career
civil servant.203 Bush’s appointment to the position would not be
197. See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics,
and Agency Preferences, 16 Pol. Analysis 3, 4 (2008) (displaying agencies on a left–right
spectrum using a method for measuring agency preferences based on expert surveys and a
“multirater item response model to jointly analyze the responses and objective information
about agency characteristics”).
198. Report of Tabulations of Population to States and Localities Pursuant to 13 U.S.C.
141(c), 15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2001).
199. Id. § 101.1(a)(1).
200. Id. § 101.1(a)(4).
201. See Don Evans: Former Secretary of Commerce, White House, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/government/evans-bio.html [http://perma.cc/WQN4-ZPN8] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2016).
202. Report of Tabulations of Population to States and Localities Pursuant to 13 U.S.C.
141(c), 15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2002).
203. Steven A. Holmes, Census Power Is Returned to Secretary of Commerce, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 17, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/17/us/census-power-is-returnedto-secretary-of-commerce.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Under the Clinton
regulation that Mr. Evans rescinded, the head of the Census Bureau—an acting director
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conﬁrmed until more than a year later, meaning that a preference
divergence between Secretary Evans and the acting Census Director
would persist for some time.204 Perhaps not surprisingly, Secretary Evans
ﬁnalized the revocation less than two weeks before the Census Director
was expected to make his decision regarding the use of statistical
sampling.205 The Bush Office of Legal Counsel also advised Secretary
Evans that revoking the subdelegation would not require submitting to
APA notice-and-comment procedures, even though the Clinton Administration had earlier used such procedures to adopt the rule.206 This
episode illustrates how new political appointees can revoke delegations
to subordinates no longer expected to share their preferences.
Turning now to the second dimension regarding internal transaction costs, exogenous variations in those costs would be expected to
inﬂuence the agency head since subdelegation can eliminate those
transaction costs. The agency head will no longer have to spend limited
resources reviewing staff recommendations and can instead farm out the
decisionmaking altogether. This perspective helps to illuminate the ways
in which intra-agency inefficiency can explain ﬁnal subdelegation as a
practice. The more these transaction costs increase, holding other factors
constant, the more likely an agency head is to subdelegate with ﬁnality to
eliminate those costs. These dynamics become even more pronounced in
light of agencies’ ﬁxed budget constraints, which exert pressure to use
organizational resources more cost-effectively.
Indeed, this general insight has been used to explain, with plausible
empirical support, why Congress delegates to executive agencies rather
than subdelegating internally to its committees to pass legislation.207 In
Professors David Epstein and Sharon O’Halloran’s theory, the median
legislator delegates to the executive branch to avoid the transaction costs
associated with Congress’s internal committee system, as long as her
preferences are sufficiently aligned with those of the President. Such
committees contribute to inefficient delays, holdups, and logrolling. So
within some range of expected preference divergence, the median legis-

who is a career civil servant—would have had to make a decision whether to adjust the
population count.”).
204. See Tom Mesenbourg, Remembering Louis Kincannon U.S. Census Bureau:
Census Blogs (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2012/
12/remembering-louis-kincannon.html [http://perma.cc/3R9M-5SZT] (“President George
W. Bush nominated Louis for director of the Census Bureau in November 2001, and the
Senate conﬁrmed him unanimously on March 13, 2002.”).
205. Holmes, supra note 203.
206. Applicability of APA Notice and Comment Procedures to Revocation of Delegation
of Authority, 25 Op. O.L.C. 99, 99 (2001).
207. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 5, at 7–9 (arguing that “when deciding
where policy will be made, Congress trades off the internal policy production costs of the
committee system against the external costs of delegation”).
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lator would prefer to delegate a policy to an administrative agency rather
than attempt to pass a bill to accomplish her desired end.208
This comparative-transaction-cost theory is similarly illuminating in
the agency-subdelegation context. Here, the internal transaction costs
associated with a reviewable subdelegation include both the costs that
arise as a result of expected preference divergence with the staff member
(principal–agent dynamics) as well as those that arise even when preferences are aligned (team-theory issues).209 While the principal–agent
dynamics have already been explored, it is also important to consider the
implications when agency heads and staff members are on the same
team—that is, when they have the same preferences. In these situations,
transaction costs arise as a result of the need to coordinate bureaucratic
advice giving.
Perfect communication is difficult enough between two individuals,
let alone within large organizations like administrative agencies. In these
settings, it is rare for low-level career staff to meet directly with agency
heads. Rather, staff recommendations are usually ﬁltered through multiple levels of an internal hierarchy. Supporting information, in turn, is
distilled into bullet points and brieﬁngs instead of conveyed in its full
and lengthy form as reports or academic papers. Consequently, as discussed, reviewable subdelegations require costly internal structures and
processes to coordinate the necessary review.210 It is thus understandable
why agency heads would seek to avoid these information-processing costs
altogether by delegating a decision when the expected biases are sufficiently small. The agency head can essentially get the same bang for less
buck.
As a result, the higher the internal transaction costs, the more one
would expect to see subdelegations increase on net. This dynamic may,
for instance, help to explain why the bulk of agency subdelegations are
technical in nature. Of course, these issues are also the areas in which the
information asymmetry between agency heads and more expert subordinates is the greatest. But the internal transaction costs associated with
reviewing such decisions are also especially high. They are high due to
what Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermuele refer to as “tacit
expertise,” information possessed by experts that is “costly to transmit to
nonexperts[] and which is always distorted in the transmission.”211 Because
208. See id. at 46–47 ( “[P]olitical governance structures should minimize the political
transaction costs associated with the implementation of a given policy.”).
209. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 984 (2004) (characterizing team theory as an approach that
“assume[s] away any divergence of preferences among individual agents”).
210. See Nou, supra note 11, at 435–40 (arguing that “internal managerial forms” are
developed to minimize information-processing costs).
211. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 Mich. L. Rev.
1355, 1357 (2016).
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technical information is difficult to compile and communicate to more
generalist audiences like political appointees, one would expect agency
heads to delegate more in these areas to reduce internal transaction costs.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Part now takes a step back to evaluate the normative implications of this information-forcing theory of agency subdelegation.212 The
previous analysis argued that internal delegation, at its core, presents a
trade-off for the agency head between better information, on the one
hand, and political control, on the other. Where this balance is struck
will depend on the administrator’s preferences, those of her subordinates,
and the transaction costs of internal review. What is in the agency head’s
interest, however, is not always best for the administrative state. Indeed,
much of administrative law is designed to cabin the discretion of bureaucratic actors to conform to a legal regime that itself struggles to
balance accountability with agency expertise. This Part will thus examine
how courts and political actors can help to optimize the acquisition of
high-quality information in the administrative state.
A.

Courts

The ﬁrst challenge from a normative standpoint is to ask how courts
can encourage research incentives without sacriﬁcing the requisite
amount of democratic accountability.213 What is “requisite,” of course has
no easy answer, but the ﬁrst section will explore the relevant constitutional constraints with respect to executive power. It will ultimately argue
for a more functional understanding of political control attuned to the
nature of the subdelegation. The second section will then turn to issues
of statutory interpretation and, speciﬁcally, how courts should read
statutes to determine whether subdelegation is congressionally authorized. The ﬁnal section will then turn to the possibility of courts further
helping to encourage credibility when externally enforcing subdelega-

212. To be sure, the theory would beneﬁt from further empirical testing to conﬁrm,
reject, or revisit it, should the relevant data become available in a more useable form. See
supra note 46 (describing the difficulties of collecting data on agency internal delegations).
The normative implications here are explored should the associated hypotheses indeed be
borne out by such analyses.
213. Judges, no less than other government officials (or human beings), also have
their own personal preferences and biases. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges 5 (2013) (modeling judges as “motivated and
constrained, as other workers are, by costs and benefits both pecuniary and nonpecuniary”).
Thus, a full model would incorporate this insight to consider what incentives judges would
have to adopt these doctrinal innovations in the ﬁrst place. The more legalistic analysis
here, by contrast, assumes that judges have an interest in vindicating the normative goals
reﬂected in existing doctrines and case law.
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tions under the Accardi doctrine—the basic principle that an agency must
abide by its own rules.214
1. Choosing Subdelegates. — Subdelegation raises constitutional worries
since agency heads may entrust signiﬁcant duties to subordinates with
attenuated relationships to the President. The core concern is that the
President, in whom the Constitution vests the “executive Power”215 and
who must “take Care” to “faithfully execute” the laws,216 will lose control
of an unelected bureaucracy. To mitigate this possibility, the Appointments
Clause and other constitutional provisions ensure that the President is
able to hire loyalists in key positions and ﬁre insubordinates.217 At the
same time, Congress may sometimes grant the ability to appoint certain
officials to other actors besides the President as well as place restrictions
on their removal.218 The potential for litigation arises when agency heads
redelegate their powers in ways that seem to contravene these constitutional mandates.
Speciﬁcally, the Appointments Clause requires the President to
nominate, and the Senate to conﬁrm, all principal officers.219 Granting
the President this authority allows her to employ the individuals most
likely to carry out her agenda dutifully. Recognizing that placing the
burden of appointing every government official on the President is
impractical, however, the Clause also allows Congress to modify this
requirement for inferior officers by assigning appointment power in “the
President alone,” “Courts of Law,” or in “Heads of Departments.”220 All
other nonofficers—employees—in the executive branch can be selected
by other government officials or through processes like those currently
governing the competitive civil service.221
The Supreme Court has yet to settle on an “exclusive criterion”222
for drawing the line between principal and inferior officers, but one
starting point is to ask whether the officer in question is subordinate to
“some higher ranking officer.”223 In Justice Scalia’s words: “Whether one
214. See sources cited supra note 54.
215. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
216. Id. art. II, § 3.
217. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
218. Id.
219. Id. (“[The President] shall nominate . . . and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of . . . inferior Officers . . . in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
220. Id.
221. For a discussion of the competitive civil service selection process, see supra note 58.
222. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 671 (1988) (“The line between ‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far
from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn.”).
223. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662–63.
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is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.”224 Indeed,
in Edmond v. United States, the judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals were inferior officers because their work was “directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed” by the President
and Senate-conﬁrmed.225 The judges could not render a ﬁnal decision
unless it survived review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
subject to procedures set forth by the Judge Advocate General.226
While Edmond could be read categorically, more functional readings
are also possible, especially when reconciling it with previous cases in
which the Court used a more ﬂexible, multifactor approach. In Morrison
v. Olson, for example, the Court held that an independent counsel—
appointed by a special panel of federal judges and removable by the
Attorney General—was an inferior officer.227 The Court largely based its
conclusion on four factors: the circumscribed scope of the counsel’s
duties, the restricted jurisdiction of the counsel’s office, the limited
duration of appointment, and the fact that the counsel was removable for
cause.228 As a general matter, then, courts scrutinize both the nature of
the exercised duties and the mechanisms of internal control.
While subdelegations run to inferior officers, they often implicate
nonofficers, or employees, as well. The Supreme Court has characterized
this group as those who do not exercise “signiﬁcant authority”229 and
usually perform “ministerial” tasks.230 In Freytag v. Commissioner, for
example, the Court found special trial judges of the United States Tax
Court to be officers, not employees.231 The trial judges were appointed by
the Chief Judge of the Tax Court.232 Because these judges “take testimony,
conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power
to enforce compliance with discovery orders,” and thus exercise “significant
discretion,” the Court held that they had to be appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause.233 At the same time, the Court has also
suggested that the analysis turns on the extent to which such discretion is
controlled by or subordinated to that of an officer.234

224. Id. at 662.
225. Id. at 663, 666.
226. Id. at 664–65.
227. 487 U.S. at 671.
228. Id. at 671–72.
229. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
230. Cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 881–82.
234. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162 (distinguishing employees who are “lesser functionaries
subordinate to officers of the United States” from officers who “are not subject to the
control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative authority”).
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Similar considerations also come into play when analyzing the
agency head’s ability to delegate to internal actors protected by congressional for-cause removal restrictions. The Supreme Court continues to
allow such restrictions based on evolving tests regarding the functional
effects of those constraints. While earlier cases tended to focus on
whether the official was acting in an executive, as opposed to “quasijudicial” or “quasi-legislative,” matter,235 more recent cases suggest that the
relevant analysis turns on the extent to which the removal restrictions
impede the President’s ability to perform his duties.236 This is an indeterminate standard, to be sure, but in Morrison, the Court upheld for-cause
removal restrictions on an independent counsel exercising purely executive prosecutorial functions.237 As in the appointments context, the Court
noted that the Attorney General still exercised control over the independent counsel by retaining “‘good cause’” removal power, nominating
candidates for the position, and declining to appoint anyone if no investigation seemed warranted.238
In this manner, courts have interpreted the Constitution to constrain the extent to which government actors can exercise authority
without sufficient political accountability. As a result, agency heads are
restrained in terms of the duties they can subdelegate. Before doing so,
agency heads must consider the ways in which such lower-level officials
are appointed, as well as the relevant removal restrictions, and calibrate
the amount of delegated discretion accordingly. Both inquiries, as
demonstrated above, can turn on the amount of internal control exercised by an accountable superior, as well as the nature of the duties
exercised. The more internal control, the broader the delegated duties
can be and the more likely such tasks can be performed by, for example,
civil servants or other subordinates with tenure protections.
In order to enhance agency heads’ ability to encourage more information investment, however, courts should also consider the credibility
of the subdelegation to assess the amount of intra-agency control exercised over the ﬁnal decision. The less credible the delegation, the more
235. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
236. As the Morrison Court put it, the “real question” is “whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional
duty.” See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010) (striking down a dual for-cause
provision on the grounds that it hindered “the President’s ability to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts”).
Though Free Enterprise Fund analyzes the effects of the dual for-cause provision on the
President’s functional ability to execute the laws, the analysis as a whole is arguably more
formalistic in that it places great emphasis on the difference between single versus double
layers of insulation. Id.
237. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–93; see also Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent
Agency Armageddon, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1349, 1356–58 (2012).
238. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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functional control the agency head should be understood to exercise.
Conversely, the more credible the delegation, the less control the agency
head should be understood to exert. Thus, for example, the less transparent and more temporary (i.e., less credible) the delegation, the more
courts should assume that agency heads have more power to review and
reverse the subdelegation. Doing so would help judicial doctrine more
closely align with institutional realities.
Some D.C. Circuit decisions regarding the Appointments Clause
help to illustrate this approach. In these cases, the D.C. Circuit has used
the ﬁnality of an official’s decision as the main factor in determining
whether a superior exercised sufficient control.239 A subdelegation that
explicitly speciﬁes ﬁnal decisionmaking authority, of course, is more
credible than those that do not. Thus, by using ﬁnality to assess whether
an agency head sufficiently supervises a subordinate for the purposes of
characterizing that subordinate as an employee or inferior officer, the
D.C. Circuit’s doctrine reﬂects practical intra-agency dynamics.
One consequence of this reﬁnement, however, would be that the
recipient of a ﬁnal subdelegation would be more likely to be deemed an
inferior (or principal) officer rather than an employee (or inferior officer), thereby narrowing the class of constitutionally appointed subdelegates. Similarly, because the agency head exercises less control, any
removal restrictions on the recipient of the subdelegation would be more
suspect. To mitigate this implication and allow the agency head the most
discretion to choose the best-informed subdelegate, courts should also
scrutinize the nature of the duty involved to determine whether it capitalizes on the delegate’s expertise. If so, then judges should be more willing
to allow authority to be exercised by tenure-protected officials or appointed by a wider array of actors. To illustrate, agency heads sometimes
internally delegate rulemaking authority, which is quasi-legislative and
thus constitutes a substantial exercise of power given the ability to bind
general classes of individuals. When the subdelegation is expertise based,
239. In Landry v. FDIC, for example, the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs who could only
recommend agency action were employees, and not constitutional officers, because they
could not make ﬁnal decisions. 204 F.3d 1125, 1132–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Based on this
holding, as previously mentioned, the D.C. Circuit in Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC also
used the lack of ﬁnality in ALJ decisions to hold that ALJs were employees and could thus
exercise the SEC’s delegated authority. 832 F. 3d 277, 284--89 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The D.C.
Circuit is currently considering Lucia en banc. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F. 3d
277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 832 F. 3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Unlike presidentially appointed and Senate-conﬁrmed Article III judges, ALJs are hired by
agencies as “necessary” for the agency to conduct formal adjudications. 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(2006); see also Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 804
(2013). Agencies select ALJs from a list prepared by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) according to various criteria, including experience as an attorney, veteran status,
and so on. Id. at 804--05. For a contrary view, see Bandimere v. SEC, No. 15-9586, 2016 WL
7439007 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016).
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such as the FCC’s grant of rulemaking authority to its Chief of the Office
of Engineering and Technology regarding spectrum standards,240 then
courts should be more willing to uphold the subdelegation scheme.
2. Statutory Interpretation. — Turning from constitutional to statutory
constraints, courts currently treat internal and external agency delegations asymmetrically. While delegations to an internal actor are presumptively valid absent express statutory proscription, those to actors outside
of the agency are not.241 In other words, when statutes are otherwise
silent, judges read such silence to permit internal subdelegation but to
prohibit delegation to an external entity—whether another agency,
private party, or a state.242 The relevant cases usually justify this approach
with one of two rationales. First, accountability for internal delegations
purportedly remains with the agency head, while external delegations
“blur” the lines of responsibility.243 Second, delegations to external entities
increase the likelihood that the resulting discretion will be exercised by
actors with different interests; as one court put it, they “aggravate[] the
risk of policy drift inherent in any principal-agent relationship.”244
While these justiﬁcations may be true as a relative matter (an open
empirical question), it is worth pausing before accepting them at face
value. Simply because an agency is formally within another, for example,
does not ensure that the lines of accountability will remain intact. The
Plan B ﬁasco, for example, erupted precisely because many presumed
that the FDA was independent of HHS despite being within the same
agency.245 Few had historically held HHS accountable for the FDA’s
determinations as a result. The same is true of the OLC, which is housed
240. 47 C.F.R. § 0.241(a)(1)(ii) (2015) (“The Chief of the Office of Engineering and
Technology is delegated authority, by notice-and-comment rulemaking if required by
statute or otherwise in the public interest, to issue an order amending rules . . . that
reference industry standards to specify revised versions of the standards.”).
241. La. Forestry Ass’n v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 745 F.3d 653, 671 (3d Cir.
2014) (recognizing the “prohibition against subdelegation to an outside entity in the
absence of express congressional authorization”); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d
554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he cases recognize an important distinction between
subdelegation to a subordinate and subdelegation to an outside party. The presumption that
subdelegations are valid absent a showing of contrary congressional intent applies only to
the former.”); Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775,
783–84 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t would be unusual, if not unprecedented, for Congress to
authorize the Board of Education to delegate its own governing authority, its policymaking
function, to another outside multi-member body.”); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort
Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 796 (9th Cir.
1986) (expressing “reluctan[ce] to read broad authority to subdelegate [to an external
actor] . . . absent clear proof of legislative intent”).
242. See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine,
55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 163, 191–93 (2013); Marisam, supra note 48, at 891 (terming the
prohibition against external delegations “the anti-redelegation doctrine”).
243. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565–66.
244. Id.
245. See Vermeule, supra note 159, at 1207–09.
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within the Department of Justice (DOJ) and provides “authoritative legal
advice” to the President and executive agencies.246 Though laboring
under subdelegated authority from the DOJ’s Attorney General,247 OLC
is often perceived as an independent entity responsible for its own
actions.248 Efforts of the DOJ or President to pressure or overrule the
OLC would likely result in a public outcry.249 As these examples reveal, it
is not always the case that internal delegations preserve accountability at
the top or ensure against policy drift.
Doctrinal innovations, however, could help the reality more closely
match the judicial rhetoric—that is, could facilitate more hierarchical
accountability while also optimizing investment in expertise. Speciﬁcally,
courts could calibrate Chevron deference to the crediblity of the delegation, thereby encouraging agency heads to delegate in a manner that both
allows for more public input and motivates costly information acquisition.250 Indeed, courts currently extend Chevron deference to interpretive
decisions to subdelegate statutory authority internally.251 However, agencies do not appear to be calibrating their analysis on the form of the
delegation. Recall, for example, the Ninth Circuit decision upholding an
NLRB delegation to its General Gounsel recorded only in internal meeting
minutes.252 The court engaged in an interpretation of the statute under
Chevron’s familiar two steps but did not consider the highly informal
nature of the mechanism through which authority was granted.253
By failing to do so, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the Mead
doctrine, which holds that Chevron deference is due when Congress has
delegated authority “to make rules carrying the force of law,” and the
agency has acted pursuant to that authority when interpreting the stat246. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t Justice, http://www.justice.gov/olc [http://
perma.cc/F2V5-ZFKB] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
247. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2016) (granting authority to “[r]ender[] opinions to the Attorney
General and to the heads of the various organizational units of the Department on questions
of law arising in the administration of the Department”).
248. See Vermeule, supra note 159, at 1209.
249. Id. at 1210 (“[T]he convention of OLC independence is enforced by anticipation
of political consequences for breaching the convention.”).
250. Chevron, of course, provides that judges must defer to an agency’s reasonable
construction of a statutory ambiguity when the statute itself evinces a legislative intent to
delegate that interpretive authority. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Its two-step test is a familiar one: First, the judge must ask
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If
Congress’s intent is “clear,” then that intention governs, but if the statute is ambiguous or
silent, then in step two, courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible”
and, if so, defer accordingly. Id. at 842–43.
251. See, e.g., Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
“[p]ursuant to the ﬁrst step of the familiar Chevron analysis, . . . [the act] limits delegation”
to a third party based on the text of the statute).
252. Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 2011).
253. Id. at 1347–54.
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ute.254 More speciﬁcally, Mead conditions deference on the extent to
which Congress provides for a “relatively formal administrative procedure”
that fosters “fairness and deliberation,” such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.255 Such qualities of open deliberation
would serve to enhance the credibility of subdelegations. Internal delegations issued after public comment, for example, would alert interest
groups that could help facilitate the entrenchment of the delegation.
More transparent grants of authority also encourage internal agency
actors to rely on the delegation and apply their expertise accordingly.
Thus, courts should extend Chevron deference only when subdelegations
are promulgated in this manner. By contrast, courts should scrutinize
under a less deferential Skidmore standard those subdelegations that are
merely contained in nonpublic agency staff manuals, meeting minutes,
or other informal documents. Under Skidmore, courts retain primary
interpretive authority but consider whether the agency has exhibited the
“power to persuade,” usually by virtue of its expertise and experience
administering the statute.256 As such, agency heads would have an
incentive to engage in more credible subdelegations since doing so
would promise more Chevron-based deferential judicial review.257
3. Judicial Enforcement. — Courts can also play a stronger role than
they currently do to enforce subdelegations by creating more bright-line
ex ante rules for agency heads seeking to credibly commit. The Accardi
doctrine generally requires agencies to follow their own rules, including
procedural rules regarding internal delegation.258 In the paradigm cases
254. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
255. Id. at 230.
256. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
257. See id. at 138. Skidmore considered an amicus brief ﬁled by the Department of
Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, who had issued an “interpretative
bulletin” containing a standard for calculating working time. Id. The Court held that
“[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.” Id. at 140. In Barnhart v. Walton, the Court considered the Social
Security Administration’s interpretation of the Social Security Act, ﬁrst through a series of
informal means and then through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
In holding that Chevron applied, the Court explained that deference was due depending
on “the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue.” Id. at 222. As
applied to the case at hand, the inquiry could include a number of factors:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration
of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
Id.
258. See sources cited supra note 54.
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relevant here, a lower-level agency official acts pursuant to a subdelegated power. When the agency head overrules or otherwise reverses the
subdelegate’s decision, an adversely affected litigant then brings suit
citing the delegation. The litigant argues that the agency head has
violated Accardi by failing to follow its own procedural rule.259 In these
circumstances, courts will look at the form and language of the internal
delegation to determine whether or not that rule should be enforced.260
Both of these dimensions, however, currently serve as sources of ex
ante uncertainty for the subordinate acting pursuant to delegated
authority. First, take the form of the subdelegation: Accardi has particular
bite with legislative rules.261 Legislative rules are those rules that are
legally binding on the agency, courts, and the public. They are generally
required to go through notice and comment.262 Nonlegislative rules, by
contrast, merely clarify rather than create new obligations; they are
exempt from notice and comment.263 Nonlegislative rules are the bread
and butter of everyday agency life: internal memoranda, guidance
documents, interpretive rules, press releases, and staff training manuals,
among others. If an agency head uses a legislative rule to subdelegate a
power, a court is likely to enforce it, especially when the litigant can show
prejudice.264 Thus, as Professor Magill has observed, this aspect of the
“doctrine means that the agency can opt into court enforcement of the
rule in the future and therefore make its self-limitation more credible in

259. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Chevron Oil Co. v. Andrus,
588 F.2d 1383, 1385–86 (5th Cir. 1979); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
587 F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1978).
260. See Merrill, The Accardi Principle, supra note 54, at 589--90 (describing as a
recurring issue in Accardi cases “the need to determine the meaning of an agency
regulation”); id. at 596--603 (discussing the basis of Accardi’s application to legislative
rules).
261. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 260 (1954); see also
Magill, supra note 51, at 878; Merrill, The Accardi Principle, supra note 54, at 603 (“[T]he
Accardi principle applies only to legislative regulations because only legislative regulations
create binding legal duties on agencies and agency personnel.”).
262. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious”
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1, 3 (1994) (referencing APA notice-andcomment procedures); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the
Perils of the Short Cut, 120 Yale L.J. 276, 277 (2010) (same).
263. Nonlegislative rules are often also referred to as “guidance documents.” See, e.g.,
Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneﬁciaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
Cornell L. Rev. 397, 399 (2007) (“Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative
rules, leading some to call them ‘nonlegislative rules.’”).
264. Magill, supra note 51, at 879 (“[A]n agency is bound to follow its rules that affect
the rights of individuals where substantial prejudice results from the violation of those
rules.”).

520

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:473

the ﬁrst instance.”265 In theory at least, agency heads could convincingly
commit to abide by an internal delegation through a legislative rule.
In practice, however, the analytical distinction between legislative
and nonlegislative rules is notoriously “tenuous” and “hazy.”266 A brief
survey of the various tests used by lower courts reﬂects their muddled and
oft-conflicting nature. Some courts, for example, rely on the agency’s own
characterization, while others apply a more objective test examining the
rule’s practical impact; still others ask whether the challenged rule
creates new legal obligations instead of simply clarifying previous ones.267
A related inquiry asks whether the agency intended the rule to be
binding on third parties and, thus, a legislative rule, as opposed to only
internally binding on the agency’s own employees.268 The D.C. Circuit
has held that objective indicia of intent include whether there is an
adequate legislative basis for the agency action without the rule, the rule
is published in the CFR, the agency has invoked its general legislative
authority, or the rule effectively amends a previous legislative rule.269 If
the answer to any of these questions is affirmative, then judges are more
likely to deem the rule legislative.270
Beyond these factors, other courts look at the extent to which the
agency has actually treated the rule as binding in enforcement proceedings or other litigation. This inquiry is complicated by the fact that
most agencies use boilerplate language renouncing the binding effect of
a rule.271 This doctrinal “smog” thus complicates an agency head’s sub-

265. See id.; see also Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1064–65 (2011) (observing that the Accardi doctrine helps
“top-level agency officials . . . to control delegations of power within the agency”).
266. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing the “spectrum” between clearly interpretive and clearly substantive as a “hazy
continuum”); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The distinction
between an interpretative rule . . . and a legislative rule . . . is often tenuous.”); Franklin,
supra note 262, at 287–88 (explaining the difficulty of distinguishing legislative and
nonlegislative rules based on APA deﬁnitions).
267. Franklin, supra note 262, at 287–88.
268. See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that courts have determined what types of “substantive agency statements” qualify
for a “‘policy statement’ exemption” from notice and comment “on the basis of the agency’s
intent to be bound”); Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg.
3432, 3437 (Jan. 25, 2007) (“[W]hile a guidance document cannot legally bind, agencies
can appropriately bind their employees to abide by agency policy as a matter of their
supervisory powers over such employees without undertaking pre-adoption notice and
comment rulemaking.”).
269. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). But see Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (stating that CFR publication is no more than “a snippet of evidence of agency
intent”).
270. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F. 2d at 1112.
271. Id. at 1111.
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delegation efforts.272 That said, the cases do suggest that agency heads
can take specific actions to increase the likelihood of judicial enforcement,
thereby increasing the subdelegation’s internal credibility. For example,
the agency head could subject the subdelegation to notice and comment
(even if not required by the APA),273 explicitly state that the subdelegation has binding effect, or publish it in the CFR. Depending on which
test is applied, many courts will be more likely to enforce the resulting
subdelegation against the agency head under the Accardi doctrine.
But even when subdelegation takes the form of a legislative rule,
courts must then engage in regulatory interpretation to determine
whether the rule indeed divested the agency head of her authority—yet
another source of doctrinal uncertainty.274 Courts currently disagree on
the appropriate method for interpreting regulations, with some focusing
on text, others on intent, and still others invoking purpose.275 Judges will
also sometimes defer to the agency head’s interpretation, while at other
times pronouncing the rule’s meaning to be “plain” or evincing a purpose contrary to that claimed by the agency.276 Subdelegations, of course,
are more likely to be credible when they are textually clear. Clarity,
however, is usually in the eye of the beholder: Judges currently have no
benchmark to determine just how much clarity is required.277 Regulatory
interpretation can thus also be a source of ex ante uncertainty for the
delegate.
Finally, even when an agency head enshrines a subdelegation in a
clear legislative rule, courts will only enforce it if the agency head’s
failure to abide by the rule affects the rights of individuals in a manner

272. See id. at 1108–09.
273. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (stating notice and comment are not required for
matters related to agency personnel or management).
274. See Merrill, The Accardi Principle, supra note 54, at 589–90 (discussing the “need
to determine the meaning of an agency regulation” as a “recurr[ing]” issue in D.C. Circuit
Accardi cases).
275. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 359–60
(2012) [hereinafter Stack, Interpreting Regulations] (describing how courts “sometimes
rely exclusively on the regulation’s text and canons of construction, but in other instances
. . . invoke aspects of the regulation’s procedural history, the court’s construction of the
authorizing statute’s purposes or congressional intent, or the agency’s own justiﬁcation for
the regulation, among other tools”).
276. See Merrill, The Accardi Principle, supra note 54, at 589–90; see also Bowles v.
Seminole Rock Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (giving “controlling weight” to an agency
interpretation so long as it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”).
277. Cf. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 275, at 357–60 (describing the
inability of courts to develop a “consistent approach” to interpreting regulations); Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2137 (2016)
(reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) (“If the statute is 60-40 in one
direction, is that enough to call it clear? How about 80-20? Who knows?”).
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that results in substantial prejudice.278 In the Ninth Circuit’s Barraza-Leon
case, for example, the petitioner claimed that the immigration judge had
violated an Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation requiring
that deportable aliens be notiﬁed of discretionary-relief eligibility.279 The
court held that even if there was an error, the error was harmless and did
not result in prejudice given that the petitioner would likely not have
qualiﬁed for discretionary relief in the ﬁrst place.280 In situations like
these, when agency heads revoke or violate a subdelegation without harm
to a third party, courts will not enforce the original subdelegation.
The upshot is that these doctrinal uncertainties and exceptions
make it more difficult for agency heads to commit credibly to a subdelegation. As a result, subordinates cannot rely on courts to predictably
enforce their delegated authority. Instead, they must make educated
guesses about whether a court will characterize the delegation as a
legislative rule, interpret the rule in a way that reﬂects the agency head’s
intent to divest authority, and ﬁnd that it results in some harm to a third
party.281 As such, courts should adopt more bright-line rules in this context to make clearer the circumstances under which they will enforce the
delegation against the agency head. What those rules are may not be as
important as picking them. For example, Accardi could apply only to
those subdelegations published as rules that undergo notice and comment and clearly express in the regulatory text an intent to delegate ﬁnal
authority. These modiﬁcations would make the Accardi analysis much
simpler and more straightforward, thus allowing agency heads more of a
safe harbor when seeking to credibly delegate authority. These innovations would augment the agency head’s ability to spur more internal
investment in expertise.

278. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754–55 (1979) (rejecting the use of
the exclusionary rule in a case of surveillance that violated agency rules because “none of
respondent’s constitutional rights has been violated here, either by the actual recording or
by the agency violation of its own regulations”); Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv.,
397 U.S. 532, 538 (1970) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission’s failure to
strictly comply with its own regulation by granting operating authority to a freight carrier
that failed to reveal certain information did not prejudice the ability of other carriers to
“make precise and informed objections to [the competitor’s] application”); see also
Magill, supra note 51, at 879–80.
279. United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 221–22 (9th Cir. 1978).
280. Even then, realistically speaking, most recipients of subdelegated authority are
not lawyers. Id. They are often scientists, economists, or policy analysts with other subjectmatter expertise. Of course, lawyers within agencies could inform and educate career staff
about these legalities, but whether they do so or not is an open question. The author has
been unable to ﬁnd any guidance documents or internal agency memoranda on the issue.
The EPA Delegations Manual also does not contain such information.
281. See supra notes 221–243 and accompanying text.
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Political Actors

This section now turns from the courts to the role political actors
like the President and Congress could play to mitigate the democratic
accountability concerns that internal agency subdelegation presents. In
particular, it focuses on the normatively troubling prospect that agency
heads could entrench their delegations and thereby prevent future parties
and Presidents from exerting intra-agency control. Given the heated contexts in which the practice often occurs, the prospect is especially
worrisome in an age of increased political polarization.282 Take, for
instance, recent complaints by Republican minority commissioners at the
FCC regarding internal delegations to the Chief of the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau.283 In their view, these subdelegations “cut
the Commissioners out of the decision-making process entirely.”284
More sharply, one of the commissioners, Michael O’Rielly, publicly
observed that:
[I]t is extremely problematic for the Commission to have a 3-to2 vote that includes broad delegation to the staff to address a
subject area further. As a minority commissioner, it is bad
enough to have your ideas and concepts rejected as a whole and
have little to no input on an item (unless you completely ignore
your principles). It is worse to see the extension of those decisions
expanded upon for years to come by a bureau under delegated
authority.285
Put differently, Commissioner O’Rielly objected to what he perceived as
a conﬂict between the majority and minority parties on the Commission
and the resulting erosion in norms of collegiality and consensus. To him,
the majority Democratic party, led by the Obama-appointed chair, instead
sought to entrench its power through the unelected agency staff.
It may be tempting to ask courts to police this prospect through the
Accardi doctrine, perhaps refusing to enforce subdelegations when liti282. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional
Dysfunction?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1691 (2015) (addressing agency legitimacy problems in an era of political polarization); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the
States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1762–65 (2015) (discussing the impact of political polarization on administrative agencies).
283. See Press Release, FCC, Joint Statement of Commissioners Ajit Pai and Michael
O’Rielly on the Abandonment of Consensus-Based Decision-Making at the FCC (Dec. 18,
2014), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-331140A1.pdf (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that the FCC Chair both improperly delegated a report
on the state of competition in the wireless industry to the Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau without their assent and that the Bureau improperly “grant[ed] a T-Mobile petition
that asked the Commission—not the Bureau—to regulate cellular data roaming rates”).
284. Id.
285. Michael O’Rielly, Delegated Authority: Serious Objections and Solutions, FCC:
FCC Blog (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/02/02/delegatedauthority-serious-objections-and-solutions [http://perma.cc/H385-8D65].
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gants can present evidence of partisan entrenchment. But a well-developed
literature in the election law context suggests that political actors may
better police against entrenchment concerns than judges can.286 For
starters, entrenchment does not admit to an obvious judicially manageable standard.287 The concept of raising the costs of repeal or amendment, for example, begs of normative baseline questions, particularly in
the context of functional entrenchment concerns: How many allies created as a result of subdelegation is too many? How much greater must
the marginal costs of repeal have to be to constitute too much? Such
questions also require difficult inquiries regarding mixed motives: Did
the agency head intend to entrench power or merely motivate internal
expertise?288 Perhaps for these reasons, along with more familiar separationof-power concerns, courts have historically been deferential to agency
heads’ judgments of how to manage their internal resources and affairs,
especially when such decisions are not ﬁxed by statute.289
Accordingly, political actors have the best set of tools and the strongest incentives to prevent the entrenchment of delegations to internal
agency actors with preferences that are no longer aligned. For starters,
Congress and the President should thus seek to render subdelegations
more transparent, thus allowing interest groups and other monitors to
aid with ﬁre-alarm oversight. Congress could, for example, amend the
Freedom of Information Act to require the publication of internal
286. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law,
and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 503, 517–18 (2004) (“Lacking a sound
framework for adjudicating political process claims, the Supreme Court’s election law
opinions often lack analytic coherence and thus provide little guidance to lower courts or
other political actors.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 630–45 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “constitutional
entanglement” with the redistricting process and “intrusi[ons] into state political
arrangements”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 644–45 (1998) (criticizing the
Supreme Court’s failure to “articulate a . . . highly functional account of what features of
democratic politics should be the focus of constitutional analysis”).
287. See Nathaniel Persily, The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in
The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics 171, 172–74
(Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006) (noting “[d]ifferent election laws will
have different competition-related effects, and maximizing competitiveness along one
dimension might diminish it on another”).
288. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 Geo. L.J. 491, 542 (1997) (“Even if one agrees that entrenchment problems have significant
antimajoritarian implications and that they are not sufficiently self-correcting, one still
might reject an anti-entrenchment theory of judicial review if the task it prescribes for
courts is unmanageable.”).
289. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836,
1872 (2015) (noting Justice Scalia’s assertion that individuals “‘cannot seek wholesale
improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally
made’” (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990))).
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subdelegations.290 The President could also issue an executive order requiring the same. In addition, or alternatively, the Office of Management
and Budget or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs could
formulate disclosure guidance for agencies pursuant to recent open government initiatives.291
Because publication is often not sufficient to garner presidential or
legislative attention, Congress might also consider requiring agencies to
submit internal delegations after a presidential transition to the relevant
congressional committees or the Government Accountability Office.
Doing so would help to enable legislative monitors to alert aligned
agency officials or else to police subdelegations otherwise contrary to current congressional preferences through hearings, appropriations decisions,
or statutory amendments. Congress or the President could go even
further by passing legislation or drafting an executive order that would
automatically sunset all internal agency subdelegations—thereby requiring
incoming agency heads to affirmatively review and ratify them. Such
measures would help to ensure that subdelegations to lower-level officials
do not persist due to simple path dependence or more conscious efforts to
engage in partisan entrenchment.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has examined the positive dynamics and normative
implications of delegation, so to speak, one-level down: the grants of
authority that agency heads routinely assign within administrative agencies. It has argued that such internal subdelegations are best understood
as credible commitment devices through which commissioners motivate
better-informed but potentially biased subordinates. The main positive
claims are that an agency head will enhance the credibility of her
290. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
291. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government to Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (ordering executive
departments and agencies to “put information about their operations and decisions
online and readily available to the public”); Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir.,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, on Open Government Directive to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies 2–6 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/open/documents/
open-government-directive [https://perma.cc/V93N-K3TQ] (requiring executive departments and agencies to take four steps toward “the goal of creating a more open
government”). For examples of such guidance documents, see Memorandum from Cass R.
Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, on Clarifying Regulatory Requirements:
Executive Summaries to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1 (Jan. 4, 2012), http://
open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Regulatory/executive_summaries.pdf [http://
perma.cc/RTH2-CKS9] (requiring executive summaries “for lengthy or complex rules”);
Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
on Policies for Federal Agency Public Websites to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec.
17, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m0504.pdf [http://perma.cc/98A9-XMQP] (detailing policies for use of federal agency public
websites).
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delegation in order to induce more information production, but only
within a bounded range of expected preference divergence. Moreover,
when intra-agency review costs increase, agency heads will be more likely
to delegate ﬁnal authority in order to eliminate those transaction costs.
This study’s main effort has been to better understand subdelegation as a
bureaucratic practice and the ways in which credibility can be institutionalized within administrative agencies.
Future research questions, of course, persist: For example, are there
stable features of an agency’s mission or jurisdiction that help to explain
agency variation beyond relative degrees of preference divergence and
transaction costs? When and why do agency heads choose internal versus
external delegations? How do the dynamics of multimember commissions differ from those of executive agencies? Only when agencies make
subdelegations more transparent can such questions be systematically
addressed. These and other inquiries suggest that a fruitful research
agenda remains in the continuing project to develop administrative law,
not only from above but also from within the agency.

